Seelöwe

[Doveton]

Kanalkampf – 1940 onwards

When discussing Luftwaffe anti-ship operations it is often made a major point of ships sunk, forgetting that under given circumstances, a ship enough damaged is just as well as a ship sunk. Maybe better as naval resources are often used to save it, with consequent increased vulnerability for the vessels involved in rescue operations. There are many examples of that. The important point is that it is out of circulation for the duration. In a Sea Lion context that would mean a couple of weeks - if the German invasion forces had been able to stabilize their position within such a timeframe the Royal Navy could do little more to save the situation. The Luftwaffe would have established itself on the English side and coastal artillery would have been organized with own and conquered batteries. The Kanalkampf is a good indicator on how daylight operations could have developed. When analyzing these facts it should be borne out that priority targets, for Luftwaffe as well as the Kriegsmarine, was the merchant trade traffic, not Royal Navy units. In a Sea Lion scenario this would have been different. Some facts and figures below – I have made a survey of the period July 10th – Aug. 24th.  Most of those RN ships not sunk were out of business for several weeks, some much longer. Not to forget that many times as many merchants were sunk or damaged by the Luftwaffe in the same period.

July 11th: Anti-submarine yacht WARRIOR II (1124grt, Captain A. E. Johnston Rtd) was sunk by German bombing off Portland.
July 13th: Convoy CW.5 departed Dover escorted only by destroyer VANESSA. The convoy was immediately taken under German air attack between Dover and Eastbourne and destroyer VANESSA was disabled by near misses of air bombs. Destroyer VANESSA was towed by destroyer GRIFFIN to Sheerness where VANESSA was repaired completing on 4 November.
July 14th: Armed merchant cruiser ESPERANCE BAY, carrying ten million pounds in gold, was bombed and badly damaged shortly after leaving England at 1250 in 49-30N, 6-40W, one hundred miles west of Land's End.
July 18th: Anti-submarine trawler CAPE FINISTERRE (591grt) was machine gunned and bombed in the North Sea.
July 19th: Dover, which was the anti-invasion base for the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, was raided twice by German bombers. Destroyer GRIFFIN was slightly damaged by near misses in the bombing and sustained no casualties. She returned to service in two weeks.
Destroyer BEAGLE, en route from Dover to Devonport, was lightly damaged by near misses off Dover, with damage to her gyro suspension. There were no casualties, and she received temporary repairs at Plymouth. On 17 August, she proceeded to Portland and repairs were completed on 28 August.
Minesweeping trawler CRESTFLOWER (550grt, Skipper C. Pollard RNR) of the 28th Minesweeping Group was badly damaged by German bombing off Portsmouth and foundered in 50-29-06N, 01-17-08W.
July 20th: BRAZEN (Lt Cdr Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, Bt) was badly damaged, taken in tow by tug LADY BRASSEY, but sank next day. 
Destroyer ACHERON was attacked by German bombers ten miles south of St Catherine's Point, near missed by nine bombs and suffered some damage. She later proceeded to Portsmouth for repairs begun on 6 August. However, before they were completed, she was further damaged in German bombing on 24 August.
July 24th: German bombing sank FLEMING (Skipper E. G. Gurney RNR). 
Anti-submarine trawler KINGSTON GALENA (550grt, Skipper S. Jackson RNR) of the 9th Anti-submarine Group and minesweeping trawler RODINO (230grt, Temporary Skipper J. C. Winning RNR) were sunk by German bombing off Dover.
July 25th: Destroyers BOREAS and BRILLIANT of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla were attacked by German bombers. Ju87s from I/STG.1 and IV/LG.1 badly damaged BOREAS with two hits on her bridge. They also badly damaged BRILLIANT with two bomb hits in the stern, although neither bombs exploded until they had passed completely through the ship. Both destroyers were towed into Dover by tugs, BOREAS by LADY BRASSEY. She was repaired at London completing on 23 January 1941. While in dock at London, she was damaged by a near miss on 19 January 1941. This damage required three days to repair. BRILLIANT was repaired at Chatham completing on 19 September.
July 27th: German aircraft launched heavy air attacks on the Dover area.
Destroyer CODRINGTON (Captain G. F. Stevens-Guille DSO, OBE, D.1), under refit, was badly hit in Dover Harbour and run aground with a broken back, but was damaged beyond repair.
Destroyer WALPOLE alongside depot ship SANDHURST in Dover Harbour was badly damaged. Repairs completed in March 1941.
SANDHURST was also badly damaged. She was further damaged in another raid on the 29th and was towed from Dover on 1 August for Portsmouth and then eventually Liverpool. Following the loss of CODRINGTON, all destroyers were temporarily withdrawn from Dover.
Destroyers MONTROSE and WREN of the 18th Destroyer Flotilla were escorting six minesweeper trawlers off Aldeburgh when they were attacked by He111 aircraft from KG.53. WREN (Cdr F. W. G. Harker) was sunk in 52 10N, 02 06E and MONTROSE badly damaged by near misses. MONTROSE was towed to Harwich and repaired at Chatham completing in June 1941.
July 29th: Destroyer DELIGHT (Cdr M. Fogg-Elliot DSO) of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla departed Portsmouth at 1500 for the Clyde, but was sunk by German bombing off Portland. (Seekrieg - The new "Freya" radar, 60 miles away, spotted the destroyer and vectored in the bombers).
Aug. 8th: Anti-submarine yachts WILNA and RION and anti-submarine trawlers CAPE PALLISER, KINGSTON CHRYSOBERYL, KINGSTON OLIVINE, STELLA CAPELLA were damaged by German bombing in the area. 
Aug. 11th: Destroyer WINDSOR was damaged by German bombing off Botany Buoy in the Thames Estuary. Completed at the end of October.
Destroyer ESK was damaged by German bombing at Harwich. She was repaired in one week.
Destroyer SCIMITAR was damaged by near misses while in Portland Harbour. Destroyer SCIMITAR was repaired in four days.
While in Portland Harbour, destroyer SKATE was damaged by near misses which wrecked her bridge. She did not require immediate repair for the damage.
Aug. 12th: Destroyer WATCHMAN was damaged by near misses of air bombs north of Ireland. She spent no time out of service, but proceeded later in the month to Hull for refitting.
Minesweeping trawlers PYROPE (295grt, Temporary Skipper A. J. Folkard RNR) and TAMARISK (545grt, Skipper S. C. W. Bavidge RNR) of Minesweeper Group 2 were sunk by German bombing off North East Spit Buoy in the Thames Estuary. 
Minesweeping trawler ELIZABETH ANGELA (253grt, Temporary Skipper F. A. Meggitt RNR) was sunk by German bombing in the Downs, in 51-19-57N, 1-33-03E.
Aug. 14th: Patrol sloop KINGFISHER and tug CARBON were damaged by German bombing in Portland Harbour.
Aug. 16th: Because of continued heavy German air bombing, light cruisers SOUTHAMPTON and BIRMINGHAM were ordered moved from Sheerness to Rosyth and light cruiser CARDIFF was ordered moved from Harwich to the Humber.
Minesweeping trawler REGARDO (248grt) was damaged by German bombing in Osbourne Bay. 
Auxiliary steamer LOCH RYAN (210grt) was damaged by German bombing forty miles northwest by north of Longships Light.
Aug. 24th: Destroyer ACHERON in Portsmouth Harbour was badly damaged by German bombing.
Destroyer BULLDOG, which was moored alongside, was damaged. French torpedo boat FLORE's bridge in Portsmouth Harbour was damaged by falling masonry in this attack.
Destroyer BULLDOG was repaired at Portsmouth completing on 2 September.
Destroyer ACHERON was repaired at Portsmouth completing on 2 December.

Your original comment referred to 'several destroyers sunk within a week' during Kanalkampf.

All the above does is demonstrate that your original comment was incorrect, and whilst you might think that incidents such as ' Auxiliary Steamer LOCH RYAN (210grt) was damaged by German bombing 40 miles northwest by North of Longships Light' were crucial to the success of Operation Sealion, I doubt anyone else would concur with this view.

Finally, whilst your list is interesting, despite some innaccuracies, much of what is on it is not relevant to Kanalkampf in any case!   

[Urs Heßling]

July 11th: Anti-submarine yacht WARRIOR II (1124grt, Captain A. E. Johnston Rtd) was sunk by German bombing off Portland.
July 20th: BRAZEN (Lt Cdr Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, Bt) was badly damaged, taken in tow by tug LADY BRASSEY, but sank next day. 
July 27th: German aircraft launched heavy air attacks on the Dover area. Destroyer CODRINGTON (Captain G. F. Stevens-Guille DSO, OBE, D.1), under refit, was badly hit in Dover Harbour and run aground with a broken back, but was damaged beyond repair.

einige Erklärungen für die Freunde von Abkürzungen in englischer Sprache:
Rtd = retired = pensioniert, d.h. in diesem Fall : in den aktiven Dienst zurückgekehrt
Bt = Baronet = Freiherr
D.1 = Senior Officer Destroyer flottilla 1 = Flottillenchef der 1. Zerstörerflottille

... Anti-submarine yacht WARRIOR II

ein U-Boots-Tender und ein schmuckes Schiffchen http://forum.oldweather.org/index.php?topic=854.0

Gruß, Urs

[AndreasB]

Finally, whilst your list is interesting, despite some innaccuracies, much of what is on it is not relevant to Kanalkampf in any case!   

I guess the point he feels he is making is rather that planes could sink and damage ships.

Not that that was ever in question.

Not sure how much masonry could fall onto a RN vessel in mid-channel though.

All the best

Andreas

[Doveton]

Finally, whilst your list is interesting, despite some innaccuracies, much of what is on it is not relevant to Kanalkampf in any case!   

I guess the point he feels he is making is rather that planes could sink and damage ships.

Not that that was ever in question.

Not sure how much masonry could fall onto a RN vessel in mid-channel though.

All the best


I quite agree, no-one would argue that the RN would not sustain both losses and damages, but the point at issue is could the Luftwaffe cause sufficient damage to the British anti-invasion ships before the British destroyed any possibility of a successful landing. I agree with the Luftwaffe commanders of the period, who did not believe that they could.

Furthermore, you have the problem of night operations, when the Luftwaffe (and the RAF) could not operate at all against targets at sea, whereas the RN was highly trained in night action techniques.

[AndreasB]

On the radar question, two AA cruisers with radar had been commissioned during May and June, HMS Bonaventure and HMS Naiad, the first Didos. Both came with Type 279. HMS Phoebe and HMS Dido were commissioned by the end of September, so would not have been available due to working up.

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Bonaventure1.htm

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Naiad.htm

Both were employed in the NW Approaches in September.

Also, all the converted C-class light AA cruisers carried Type 280 radar, which was apparently very good at ship detection. But no idea if any were serving in home waters, most seem to have been in the Med and the Indian Ocean, and HMS Curlew had of course been sunk.

All the best

Andreas

[Doveton]

On the radar question, two AA cruisers with radar had been commissioned during May and June, HMS Bonaventure and HMS Naiad, the first Didos. Both came with Type 279. HMS Phoebe and HMS Dido were commissioned by the end of September, so would not have been available due to working up.

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Bonaventure1.htm

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Naiad.htm

Both were employed in the NW Approaches in September.

Also, all the converted C-class light AA cruisers carried Type 280 radar, which was apparently very good at ship detection. But no idea if any were serving in home waters, most seem to have been in the Med and the Indian Ocean, and HMS Curlew had of course been sunk.

All the best

Andreas

For your information, by September 1940 the RN had rebuilt six old 'C' class cruisers as AA Cruisers. Curlew had been lost off Norway, but Coventry & Carlisle were on the East Indies Station (Carlisle was refitting in Colombo), Calcutta was with the Mediterranean Fleet, and Curacoa & Cairo were part of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Squadron. In mid-September, they were based at the Humber.

Naiad & Bonaventure, the first two Didos in service, were at Rosyth as the 15th Cruiser Squadron, operating with the bulk of the Home Fleet.

Hope this is of help.

[AndreasB]

Thanks!

Both of these had Type 279 fitted by September as well.

All the best

Andreas

[Doveton]

Thanks!

Both of these had Type 279 fitted by September as well.

All the best

Andreas

The third and fourth Didos to commission (Phoebe & Dido) both completed on 30 September, and commenced working up with the Home Fleet during the first week of October. Phoebe was also fitted with Type 279, whereas Dido became the first cruiser in the Royal Navy to carry Type 281.

Because of a shortage of the 5.25 inch turrets which were the main armament of the Dido class ( and the secondary armament of the King George V class battleships ) only Naiad of the first four Didos carried the intended 5 turret armament. The other three had four mountings, with a 4 inch starshell gun in place of the fifth turret.

After completion of the first four, construction of the remainder was suspended for a time as priority was given to the KGVs. As a result the fifth, Hermione, was only completed on 25.03.41, despite having been laid down as early as 06.10.37.

[Knouterer]

Kanalkampf – 1940 onwards

When discussing Luftwaffe anti-ship operations it is often made a major point of ships sunk, forgetting that under given circumstances, a ship enough damaged is just as well as a ship sunk. Maybe better as naval resources are often used to save it, with consequent increased vulnerability for the vessels involved in rescue operations. There are many examples of that. The important point is that it is out of circulation for the duration.

Quite correct - and that applies to the ships of the invasion fleet too, probably even more so. For instance, even relatively minor damage by gunfire to the loading booms (Ladegeschirr) of the transporters (which as Schenk notes was barely adequate to begin with), or a list of just a couple of degrees, might make it impossible to unload vehicles and artillery.

[Leandros]

Kanalkampf – 1940 onwards

Quite correct - and that applies to the ships of the invasion fleet too, probably even more so. For instance, even relatively minor damage by gunfire to the loading booms (Ladegeschirr) of the transporters (which as Schenk notes was barely adequate to begin with), or a list of just a couple of degrees, might make it impossible to unload vehicles and artillery.

That would undoubtedly be an additional burden to all the others but, as an active and resourceful naval leader at site, what would you do about that when the unloading area (eventually) was reached..........? Unfortunately, these were the sort of problems the Germans were very good at solving on the tactical level.

Fred

[AndreasB]

It's because Germans always eat their wheeties for breakfast, with cod liver oil, that's why they are so good at solving tactical puzzles, better than anyone else.  In fact, if the Allies had done so too they could have saved themselves all the trouble they went to with Overlord planning.

Can't beat those Germans. Well, except during two world wars and in one world cup.

All the best

Andreas 

[Leandros]

It's because Germans always eat their wheeties for breakfast, with cod liver oil, that's why they are so good at solving tactical puzzles, better than anyone else.  In fact, if the Allies had done so too they could have saved themselves all the trouble they went to with Overlord planning.

Can't beat those Germans. Well, except during two world wars and in one world cup.

All the best

Andreas 

I know, they are very good. Who beat the Germans in two world wars, please....?

Apart from that, you wouldn't know a practical way to solve your assumed problem...?

Fred

[Knouterer]

Tactical problems are one thing, and insuperable technical problems another. The transporter/Dampfer fleets from Rotterdam and Antwerp were obviously one of the several Achilles heels of Sea Lion. To begin with, the Admiralty would certainly have sent out a few destroyer flottilas plus cruisers with the traditional RN orders to "sink,burn and destroy" as soon as they were informed about large scale movement from those ports (which would be S-4 from Antwerp, S-2 from Rotterdam).

But even assuming  these fleets by some miracle made it more or less unscathed to the invasion areas B and C, what then? They would be like the Light Brigade - cannon in front of them, cannon to the right of them and cannon to the left of them.
I believe I have now pinpointed the coast batteries present in Sept 1940 fairly accurately, and according to the plans, as I understand them, the ships would anchor in a double line parallel to the beach, maybe some 5000-6000 m out, which in Abschnitt B would place them in the line of fire and within easy range of several batteries around Folkestone to the north and Dungeness Point to the south. Ammunition supply for these guns would perhaps be limited, but the 6" and 5.5" guns at Folkestone could be easily resupplied from Dover, and it seems there were a couple of 6" Mark XIX field guns near Lydd, which fired the same ammunition as the Mark VII coast gun, so that might have been a source of resupply for Dungeness. So in my personal scenario, these immobile and defenceless ships would have been shelled more or less all day, with perhaps a couple of destroyers dodging the Luftwaffe firing a dozen torpedos at noon, followed by an attack of say 2 squadrons of Coastal Commmand Hudsons at dusk, followed by more attacks by MTBs and subs during the night, etc. ... I find it seriously difficult to imagine there would have been anything left by next morning.

Similar problems in Abschnitt C (ships to anchor directly in line with the coast battery at Jury's Gut Sluice).

[Huszar]

@Knouterer:

What do you think, how long would it take to overrun the guns at Lydd and Dungeness? What do you think, how many shells these guns had to "shell the fleet all day"? And as I pointed out, about half the Folkstone-batteries were NOT sighted to fire south-southwest, but to fire to the south-east!

I am also REALLY bored about this "RN would have sunk every ship form Rotterdam/Antwerpen" sh**t. IF the RN would find these fleets, it would be MAYBE possible to sink a FEW ships, but NOT all!
If the RN attacks the fleet south of Folkstone in the 2nd night, they PROBABLY could thing more than a few ships, but hey, 20% of the stuff on bord will be landed at this time.

best regards

[Leandros]

Knouterer: I do not find your suggested estimation of the British response to an enemy landing unrealistic. However, as many others, you assume that the Germans wouldn't, or couldn't, shoot back - or bomb ahead.........As for Beach B, this area would have the support of the whole refurbished Stuka force. Static coastal artillery positions are very forgiving Stuka targets........The Germans might have thought of that. In addition to a few other bombers. Quite a lot, actually.

Another aspect: The Luftwaffe orders for Seelöwe was to harass the RN in their ports from S-day minus 10 to S-day minus 1. At that day the priority should be strategic targets, railways, roads, army concentration points, storage areas. On S-day everything should be concentrated on the assault itself.

The improvised artillery ships, some with 15 cm. guns, was also, I believe, meant to counter the shore batteries. If I remember correctly there was at least nine of those vessels dedicated to Beach B. What of the armaments of the transports themselves? I do not have details on this but I am working at it.

Firstly: That any RN destroyers would stick their heads into the mellee during daytime is contradicted by contemporary events. Apart from the fact that they had standing orders not to venture into the Channel in daylight (a result of previous experiences), this is confirmed by their lack of action during the only real invasion scare, when the Cromwell signal was transmitted. One offensive RN patrol was in the Channel. No more were, or could be, raised that night. The day after, no patrols were sent out. Only the second night was two patrols sent out. The fact is that the RN didn't have flotillas available in the Channel area at a short notice at this time and there were no destroyers or cruisers based between Portsmouth and the Channel Estuary. They had been chased away by the Luftwaffe.

Hudsons: the Hudson CC force was not trained or equipped for anti-ship operations at the time, mainly for reconnaissance. The results of British low-level attacks in France (the AASF was more or less demolished) indicates that such a venture against a landing fleet bristling with AA weapons would have been a disaster. The two CC dedicated torpedo squadrons of Beauforts had only just started torpedo training and was not operational with their weapons.

MTB's: The RN MTB force at this time was more or less a joke. This is shown by their lack of results against the German coastal traffic along the French coast at this time. The landing fleet was to be much better defended than those convoys.

Fred