Aus Hattendorf, John B.: Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean – Past, Present and Future
Hier: Paul G. Halpern: French and Italian Naval Policy in the Mediterranean, 1898-1945 (My remarks and questions in italics)"
(...) France´s diplomatic situation improved significantly when the Anglo-French entente changed the Royal Navy from a potential enemy to a potential ally and the Italo-French entente of 1902 at least weakened somewhat Italiy´s ties to the Triple Alliance, although until the outbreak of the war no one could really be sure of the actions of the Italian government.
The French programs were subject to the vagaries of the legislature, and during the period when the Radical Camille Pelletan was Minister of Marine (June 1902 – January 1905) the building program received a severe setback. Moreover the strategic balance with the Triple Alliance had altered to the disadvantage of the French. By 1900 the Triple Alliance had an advantage of 28:13 in battleships, which translated into a slight French inferiority in the Channel and a manifest inferiority in the Mediterranean. (French commissioned battleships in 1900: 5 Charles Martel "class", 3 Charlemagne class, Amiral Baudin, Brennus, Marceau, Neptune, Magenta. Battleships Hoche, Formidable, Courbet, Devastation and Amiral Duperre as well as the 4 small Requin class battleships and the coastal defender Furieux were under reconstruction. Bouvines class (2) and Jemmappes class (2) coastal defence battleships are not counted.
Triple Alliance battleships commissioned in 1900:
Germany = 4 Brandenburg class and Kaiser Friedrich III and Kaiser Wilhelm II of the old Kaiser-class (6). The 8 coastal defence battleships of the Siegfried class and the 4 older barbette ships of the old Sachsen class are not counted.
Italy = 2 St. Bon class , 3 Re Umberto class, 3 Ruggerio di Lauria class, 2 Duilio class, 2 Italia class (12) .
Austria Hungary = 3 Monarch class coastal defence battleships, Stefanie (barbette ship), Rudolph (barbette ship) and Tegetthoff (central battery ship)(6).
After all it seems quite clear, that Halperns calculation of strength is not correct. Partly ships under reconstruction are not counted, partly coastal defenders (A-H) are counted, others (F, G) not. Older German ships are not counted, while being commissioned at least as school ships, older Italian ships are counted.
The real strengths are: France Triple Alliance
Battleships in commission 13 24
Coastal defenders/older bb 4 12
Out of com/reconstruction 10 ?)
The French therefore decided in 1900 to concentrate in the north to defeat the German fleet while remaining on the defense in the Mediterranean.
In 1901 they returned to their to their old strategy of concentrating first against Italy in the Mediterranean before turning to the Germans. This fluctuation and perennial debate, concentration in the Channel or in the Mediterranean, reflected the French strategic dilemma. They could combine their forces to achieve superiority over either the German or the Italian fleet but not both at the same time, and by around 1905 the ability to achieve superiority over either the German fleet by any combination ended.
(By mid 1905 Germany had commissioned 18 pre-dreadnought battleships. At this time France could field only 11 comparable units)
(...) In their instructions de guerre of 1910 and 1911 the French inexplicably and propably unrealistically abandoned the Mediterranean as their area of primary concentration in a war against the Triple Alliance. The french battlefleet would return to the Mediterranean only after the major German naval forces had been destroyed (sic!).
(...) Reality returned to the naval planning in 1912 when, largely at the insistence of Vice-Amiral Marie Aubert, Chief of the Naval Staff, the French abandoned the idea of opposing the German fleet in the north and returned to a Mediterranean concentration.
Questions:
After concentrating the battleships in one force the French switched the fleet back and forth 3 times in 12 years between Toulon and Brest. Has there ever been a naval doctrine of lasting importance with the French Naval staff at that time?
Many older barbette ships of the 1880s were extensivly reconstructed and modified in the period after 1900, while this was due to the slowlyness and the bad protection of these ships not really reasonable. Did they get modified only because funds for new ships were getting denied by Monsieur Pelletan?
What was the Italo-French entente?
Servus Ekke,
What was the Italo-French entente?
Vielleicht bezieht sich das auf das französisch-italienische Geheimabkommen von 1902, in den sich beide Seiten über ihre territorialen Wünsche in Afrika einigten. Marokko und Tunesien für Frankreich, Lybien für Italien. Ein sehr geschickter Schachzug des damaligen französischen Außenministers Théophile Delcassé. Damit waren möglichen Reibungspunkte mit Italien minimiert. Sollte Frankreich keinen Angriffskrieg gegen Deutschland oder Österreich beginnen, stand den Italienern die Option der Neutralität in einem Konflikt der genannten Länder offen. Da Italien keine weiteren Interessen gegenüber Frankreich besaß, konnte man das Risiko Italien als möglichen Gegner zu haben von da an auf französischer Seite als gering betrachten.
Faszinierend, Thomas: Die Türken lassen Messudieh, Assar-I-Tewfik, Avn-I-Illah, Feth-I-Bülent und Muin-I-Zafer zwischen 1902 und 1907 bei Ansaldo in Genua modernisieren und gleichzeitig einigt sich Italien mit Frankreich darüber, dass sich niemand aufregt, wenn sich Italien vom treuen Kunden die Provinz Libyen einverleiben will :MLL:
"Drama" nicht vergessen, Ekke.
Das die Türkei ihre Schiffe gerade in Italien hat modernisieren lassen, dürfte verschiedene Gründe gehabt haben.
Einer war sicher der, daß mit dem Typ "Garibaldi" den Italienern ein wirklich guter Entwurf gelungen ist. Damit erhielt die italienische Werftindustrie ein sehr hohe internationale Reputation. Selbst Kaiser Wilhelm II. war von den "Garibaldi's" begeistert, ebenso von den späteren Linienschiffen der "Regina Elena"-Klasse. Tirpitz mochte diese Schiffe wiederum gar nicht. Aber nicht aus technischer, sondern aus etatpolitischer Hinsicht.
Reichlich offtopic, sorry. Zurück zum Thema.
The early XX Century French and Italian better diplomatic relations, with Paris accepting the idea Italy could mainmise Tripolitania in change of French free hand in Morocco (the two Algesisas conferences), was over just after the first days of the 1911-1912 War for Libya between Italy and Turkey and some episodes like the seize, by the Italian navy, of the French freighters Chartage and Manouba which were carrying weapons for the Turks, did not help the mood!
By 1912 the British attitude too changed as while the Cabinet had accepted the idea the Italians could invade Tripoli the Admiralty and the government reacted quite bad at the news, some days after the early landings in Libya, that Beghazi too and Tobruk had been occupied "by error" by the Italian Navy as they considered those towns as an ideal springboard towards the Middle East. It was a funny idea as no logistic work was begun before 1935, but even the Crimea War in 1855 begun because their Lordships believed it would have been possible fo land at that peninsula istmus not considering the low bottom of those waters.
Since late 1911 until 30 July 1914 the French and British sttitude towards Italy was a pure hostile one.
The Italian naval strategy remained, since late 1880s until 1914, a guerrila one against France in Western Mediterrenan with the purpose to gain some decisive days of delay of the ferry (through the Atlantic route instead of the short run between Algiers and Marseille) of the North African corps in the plains of France where the main clash would have been between the Transalpine and the German Army who would have been supported by an Italian Army in Lorainne including all the three cavalry divisions of the Regio Esercto.
The main tool of this strategy were at first the fast battleships of the Saint Bon class (a sort of super arm. cruisers) and the two Regina Elenas with the Garibaldis and, later, the four Vittorio Emanuele fast pre dreadnoughts supported by the two Pisa and the two San Giorgio arm. cruisers.
I'm surprised at Von Tirpitz critics at this scheme as he supported in 1912-1914 this program offering the just sent German battlecruiser to join the raid force while the Regia Marina ordered three long range destroyers (the Poerio class) with the task to escort that BB and the light cruiser of the German Mittlemeer Division in the planned war at the traffic in Western Mediterranean.
Hoping this text in English may be read without too many problems by the Forum fellowship
Greetings
EC