Seelöwe

[Bergedorf]

Aus den Cabinet Papers:

C O S . (40) 199th Meeting.29 June 1940:

RDF might detect the approach of the ships of
a sea-borne expedition up to 29 miles, but it would not
be safe to count on receiving any warning from this
sourceo There would probably be large numbers of
our own craft in the area which might make it difficult
to identify the enemy,, In certain conditions we
might not get warning from the air of the approach of an
invading force, and the first information might be
obtained from the auxiliary patrols working only 8 to
10 miles from the coast

Hier kann man noch mal die Wege der Landungsflotten sehen:
http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/ksp/england/seeloewe-frames.htm

[Kosmos]

BoB was preparation for Seelöwe, Luftwaffe had to neutralise RAF because it is very difficult simultaneously to fight of british bombers attacking german landing craft, attack british warships steaming to canal and to provide close air support.
But Luftwaffe even failed to destroy RAF as it, Luftwaffe, was able to concentrate completely on that task. So no doubt, Luftwaffe would fail by attempt to solve tasks which are more ambitious.

While BoB was supposed to be a preparation for Seelöwe the Luftwaffe mostly flew missions which were of little use to it, and not against Royal Navy installations and vessels, except in the first part, the Kanalkampf. The Kriegsmarine complained about this several times to the OKW and Hitler. If Seelöwe had been given a go-ahead, say on Sept. 17th, Luftwaffe would have to act according to the specific orders for Seelöwe which were very different from those actually flown.  According to these orders S-8 to S-1 missions should be flown against the RN, S-1 against infrastructure, troop concentrations and communications. On S-day priority was to support the landings. However, on both sides of the Channel were LW units specifically earmarked for protection against RN intrusions. As a matter of fact all LW units had this as their first priority. While few believe the RAF, under the prevailing conditions, could do much against the landing fleet itself, their primary mission would be to keep the German bombers away from the RN vessels.

BoB was a big mission against RAF, but in the same time as luftwaffe was flown that mission RAF was able to attack parts of german landing fleet...

You can order all possible prioritys but the question would be, had the luftwaffe enough strengh to success?

RAF has had fighter AND bomber forces, RAF could at the same time protect naval vessels and attack german landing fleet, a landing fleet consisting of very vulnerable ships. The scary thing had been to unload the big transport ships, for long time immoveable, huge and unarmored aims for RAF.

But i think RN was able to destroy german landing fleet, to.

You can speculate how many warships Luftwaffe was able to destroy in an hour, but there are no speculations, luftwaffe was not able to destroy warships in open see by the night. And there can be no speculations, Kriegsmarine was to weak to servive  such a battle.
So at the latest second or third night after beginn of operation RN warships would rape german transport ships. Soon there would be no transport ships for operation Seelöwe.

[Leandros]

However, this does not mean, that I regard an M35 as an effective fighting platform against destroyers 

mfg

alex

May main reason for "pushing" the M35 is that almost no one has considered it at all. After all, at least theoretically, 19 were available for Seelöwe. As my research has showed that quite few RN destroyers actually were available at short notice in the Channel area - Chatham-Falmouth - in the end of September, gives this some importance. As for its fighting efficiency much emphasis has been put on the fact that it did not have a centralized fire control system, as opposed to the RN destroyers. Doing some digging I have found that the M35 at least had a  Leiter Artilleriegeschütze with his position on the upper bridge close to the rangefinder operators. That said, I believe the M35 had better artillery optics than the RN destroyers, particularly its 3 m. rangefinder. In a night fight I see no reason why two M35's with its 4 10,5 cm. in 4 turrets should not equal a Hunt with 4 guns in two turrets or a V&W with 3-4 guns in 3-4 turrets. I also see no reason why the German gun crews should fire any slower than the similar British ones. The Hunts didn't have torpedoes. The V&W's did.

[Leandros]

Aus den Cabinet Papers:

C O S . (40) 199th Meeting.29 June 1940:

RDF might detect the approach of the ships of
a sea-borne expedition up to 29 miles, but it would not
be safe to count on receiving any warning from this
sourceo There would probably be large numbers of
our own craft in the area which might make it difficult
to identify the enemy,, In certain conditions we
might not get warning from the air of the approach of an
invading force, and the first information might be
obtained from the auxiliary patrols working only 8 to
10 miles from the coast

The CHL is generally considered as not able to detect aircraft under 500 feet altitude. Therefore I believe this quote is more a pep talk than anything else.

Hier kann man noch mal die Wege der Landungsflotten sehen:
http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/ksp/england/seeloewe-frames.htm

Your map does not show the approach routes of the invasion convoys. It is just a general map of the (early) plan. The final plan was contracted to landings east of Brighton and west of Dover. The route actually went along the French coast to later cut over the Channel west of the Dover barrage(s). It was detailed in the navy's order of (I believe) Sept. 14th.

[Huszar]

Hallo,

First of all: would it be to much to ask for, if you don't make double-postings, and edit your last post?

M35: I asked you this before, but I have to ask it again:
- are you aware, how many Hunts they really were commisioned end of September 1940?
- are you aware, that there is not generic "V&W-class", but three of them? (Wair, Original-V, Modified-W)
- are you aware, that the modified Ws had not 10,2cm, but 12cm?
- what do you think is an M35 will face with more chances: Hunts, Wairs, Original-Vs, Modified Ws, or something even younger?


@Dirk:

It is perfectly clear  that the british side would have many problems too

Überraschendes Zugeständnis, muss ich sagen. Und praktisch das erste mal, dass ich sowas von der Kontra-Partei höre.

mfg

alex

[Leandros]

It is perfectly clear  that the british side would have many problems too

Überraschendes Zugeständnis, muss ich sagen. Und praktisch das erste mal, dass ich sowas von der Kontra-Partei höre.

mfg

alex

Sind wir Kontra-Parteien...?....

[Leandros]

Hallo,

M35: I asked you this before, but I have to ask it again:
- are you aware, how many Hunts they really were commisioned end of September 1940?
- are you aware, that there is not generic "V&W-class", but three of them? (Wair, Original-V, Modified-W)
- are you aware, that the modified Ws had not 10,2cm, but 12cm?

Yes. The important fact is how many were available at the time and place.

- what do you think is an M35 will face with more chances: Hunts, Wairs, Original-Vs, Modified Ws, or something even younger?

I don't think it is so much a question of age (the V&W's were old) as the tactical situation at the moment. That said, since the Hunts did not have torpedoes I would say they would be the easiest opponents...

[Huszar]

Hallo,

Are you truely incapeble to unterstand my questions?

It is NOT a question how old a ship is. It IS a question of weaponry and quantity! The chance to meet a Hunt or a Wair is far smaller, then to meet something with 3-4 pieces of 12cm AND torpedos!

best regards

[Bergedorf]

Aus den Cabinet Papers:

C O S . (40) 199th Meeting.29 June 1940:

RDF might detect the approach of the ships of
a sea-borne expedition up to 29 miles, but it would not
be safe to count on receiving any warning from this
sourceo There would probably be large numbers of
our own craft in the area which might make it difficult
to identify the enemy,, In certain conditions we
might not get warning from the air of the approach of an
invading force, and the first information might be
obtained from the auxiliary patrols working only 8 to
10 miles from the coast

The CHL is generally considered as not able to detect aircraft under 500 feet altitude. Therefore I believe this quote is more a pep talk than anything else.

Hier kann man noch mal die Wege der Landungsflotten sehen:
http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/ksp/england/seeloewe-frames.htm

Your map does not show the approach routes of the invasion convoys. It is just a general map of the (early) plan. The final plan was contracted to landings east of Brighton and west of Dover. The route actually went along the French coast to later cut over the Channel west of the Dover barrage(s). It was detailed in the navy's order of (I believe) Sept. 14th.

Sorry Fred,

but CHL could detect ships. It was actually originally designed to find ships:

C. S. Wright, Director of Scientific Research at the Admiralty, had developed Coastal Defence Radar, known as CD. This detected enemy ships' positions in order to assist coastal batteries in pinpointing precisely the ships' locations, thus ensuring their destruction. The Air Ministry saw in this a solution to the problem of detecting low-flying aircraft, and - re-labelling it Chain Home Low, or CHL - began work on constructing a second network of radar stations across the country, the first opening on 1 November, 1939.

By the time the Battle of Britain began3, there were 21 operational Chain Home stations and thirty Chain Home Lows.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/classic/A612334

For the route of the Transportflotten please go to the "Landungsabschnitte"-Site (Sorry the direct link to this site seems not to work). This are the Routes, of the Operationsplan No.1 v. 14.9.1940. You can look at these alson in the Klee-Book.

regards

Dirk

P.S.: You can also look at this: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=6021567&CATLN=6&Highlight=%2CCHL&accessmethod=0 "TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND RADIO (93): RDF for detecting enemy surface forces: provision of eleven additional CHL stations." ADM 1/10762

[AlfredP]

Hallo,

M35: I asked you this before, but I have to ask it again:
- are you aware, how many Hunts they really were commisioned end of September 1940?
- are you aware, that there is not generic "V&W-class", but three of them? (Wair, Original-V, Modified-W)
- are you aware, that the modified Ws had not 10,2cm, but 12cm?

Yes. The important fact is how many were available at the time and place.

- what do you think is an M35 will face with more chances: Hunts, Wairs, Original-Vs, Modified Ws, or something even younger?

I don't think it is so much a question of age (the V&W's were old) as the tactical situation at the moment. That said, since the Hunts did not have torpedoes I would say they would be the easiest opponents...

Hello there. Are you the Leandros from the Armchair General Alternate History forum? If so, I hope anyone reading anything you say on this site will check out every fact carefully. From what I have read on Armchair General, most of your facts are nothing of the sort, and when the correct state of affairs is explained to you you either blank it out or run away to another site.

Good to see you obsession with M1935s is still going strong, and your certainty that none of the Brit. distroyers were where history says they where. Only six Brit. Distroyers between Plymouth and the Nore were Hunts anyway so dont understand why you seem to worry about there inadequaces so much. From what I can see on this site, some people are already getting suspicious of you.

When is you book out, by the way. It isnt on the site of the publisher you refered to anymore

[ufo]

First and foremost (!) let me welcome you to this board! I shall hope you will enjoy it here.

Allow me to emphasize that we'd rather not import distant wars from other boards. Do believe me – we've tried it. It makes no one happy. Leandros did make no secret out of "The Thread That Shall Not Be Named". Everyone interested had time to read through the discussion there to make up his mind.

Alas – here is another field and I like to urge the partners in discussion to leave aside any misgivings stemming from previous discussions, meetings or the like. You are most welcome to contribute documents, arguments, ideas, numbers, citations, thoughts or doubts. Please leave behind any grievances from previous encounters.

Thank you!
And – as I said – you are most welcome to join in fruitful and – if needed – heated debate.
Ufo   

[Bergedorf]

Moin Moin,

ich habe mich heute ein wenig in den Aktenbestand ADM 179/151: Use of Air Ministry Chain Home Low radar station for warning of invasion, eingelesen:

Besonders interessant war bisher ein Dokument: Flag Officer Commanding Dover 29th October 1940 No. A14/D/1547/40:

Ich habe das mal weitgehend abgetippt, da Crown Copyright m.E. ein einstellen des Documentes ohne Genehmigung verbietet:

...be pleased to inform Their Lordships that considerable experience hat now been gained in the performance of Dover and Fairlight C.H.L. Stations as far as their reporting of surface craft is concerned.
2. It has been found that on request and having provided an indication of their whereabouts, the position an frequently the number of our own patrolling craft or convoys can be readily obtained from C.H.L. Stations.
3. On one occasion Dover C.H.L. Station, having been informed that special Intelligence indicated the presence of enemy craft, was able to determine a bearing and distance which enabled M.T.B´s to locate in low visibility and sink an enemy vessel. The vessels were of the large trawler type and their distance about 15 sea miles from the station.
4. On the other hand there have been several occasions in low visibility by day when surface vessels have been reported by C.H.L within distances of 10 miles and yet organised searches by M.T.B´s or aircraft have found nothing even though C.H.L. plots have persisted during search.
5. In addition Dover C.H.L. has passed a number of reports of surface craft giving them a course and a speed of 60 miles an hour. Experience has shown that these may savely be ignored and almost invariably the plots are reported to have faded out in a few minutes.
6. It must also be mentioned that an enemy minefield within a distance of 5 sea miles from Dover C.H.L. must have been laid at night by surface vessels of which no plot was reported.
7. Results to date must therefore be summed up as variable and unreliable.
8. It is appreciated that C.H.L. Stations have also low flying aircraft to plot and it is not altogether clear whether the continious search over sea arcs that is the necessary by night and in low visibility to establish the presence (unleserliches Wort von zwei Buchstaben) otherwise of surface craft is not sometimes irregular.
If this is the case the value of the stations to Naval Authorities is very considerably lessened.
9. It is felt that the narrow waters of Dover Strait are particularly likely to form an area in which the successful development of C.H.L. methods would prove most valuable,
Enemy vessls whether bent on minelying or other raids or merley making the passage of the Strait come within C.H.L. range.
Reliable C.H.L. information would enable M.T.B. or aircraft attacks to be organised with confidence and might well enable coastal batteries to open fire on unsighted enemy vessels.

Wie würdet ihr die Erkenntnisse des Dokumentes werten? Ich würde sagen, das das C.H.L. noch einige Macken hatte, dass im Invasionsfall (besonders wenn es eine Vorwarnung gab), eine durchaus realistische Chance bestanden hätte, das die Invasionsflotte geortet worden wäre. Wie seht ihr das?

Viele Grüße

Dirk

[ede144]

Hallo

das Radar wird als unzuverlässig beurteilt, aber was für den/die Autoren schlimmer ist, es scheint dass die Stationen mit dem Verfolgen von Flugzeugen ausgelastet sind und deshalb nicht in der Lage sind geortete Schiffe auch zu melden.

Um's mal in einem Satz zusammen zufassen: Wenn das unser System wäre und ein paar kleinere Mängel abgestellt werden, dann ist das Radar sehr sinnvoll um die Deutschen zu jagen.

Im Falle von Seelöwe würden die Stationen mit der Meldung von Luftangriffen beschäftigt sein und hätten für einzelne Schiffe/kleine Verbände wenig Zeit.

Gruß

Thomas

[Huszar]

Hallo, Dirk,

Ich würde es als "höchst unzuverlässig" definieren. Teilweise können Ziele auf mittlere Entfernung erkannt werden, teilweise nichtmal in nächster Nähe, und teilweise werden Fantome erkannt, die überhaupt nicht da sind.

Selbst die Engländer sprechen über die Möglichkeiten im Konjunktiv (Ende Oktober!), spricht nicht gerade für grosses Vertrauen.

mfg

alex

[Bergedorf]

Hallo Thomas, Hallo Alex,

das Problem mit den Flugzeugen die stören dürfte im Seelöwe-Fall eigentlich nicht so zum tragen kommen. Die Invasionsflotte wäre in der Nacht unterwegs und abgesehen von ein paar Minenlegeeinsätzen dürfte sich die Luftwaffe auch für die großen Aufgaben am Invasionstag zur Verfügung halten.

Ferner ist es ja so, dass die Radar nicht einzelne Schiffe zu orten hätten, sondern eine Invasionsflotte von, wenn wir mal nur die Schleppzüge der Transportflotte B nehmen 100 Schlepper, 200 Prähme, 200 Stoßboote und (habe die genaue Zahl gerade nicht hier) gut 50 Geleitfahrzeugen, die sich über einen Seeraum von 15km x 1.000m verteilen.

Da denke ich doch das was geortet werden würde, oder?

Das Dokument muss man ja auch unter dem Blickwinkel beachten, dass es nicht um die Ortung einer so großen Invasionsflotte, sondern um die Ortung von Schiffen generell geht.

Ich bin aber mit dem Aktenbestand auch noch nicht durch... vielleicht finden sich da ja noch weitere erhellende Angaben.

Die Dt. sind nach KTB Skl (genaues Datum müßte ich noch einmal nachschlagen), aufgrund eines nicht entdeckten Minenunternehmens (wohl das im britischen Dokument erwähnte) davon ausgegangen, dass die Briten keine Radarortung haben.

Gruß

Dirk

Bei dem nicht entdeckten Minenunternehmen scheint es sich um Unternehmen Werner (30.09-01.10.40 gehandelt haben). Dazu die Angaben zum Wetter aus den KTB Skl 01.10.1940:

Aufgabe... wahrscheinlich unbemerkt durchgeführt, zumal zur Wurfzeit infolge eintretender Bewölkung starke Dunkelheit. Gewisse Schwierigkeiten durch Seegang

Könnte es sein das Seegang bzw. Wolken die Wirksamkeit des Radars beeinflussen (Seegang halte ich aus dem Bauch für gut möglich... Wolken... hmmm... keine Ahnung..)?