Seelöwe

[Urs Heßling]

moin,

"Torpedo vs Zerstörer" - Ob ein Torpedo schneller oder langsamer als ein DD war ist wohl eher, nmV, nebensächlich. Die Torpedos sollten den DD ja auch nicht einholen, sondern von der Seite treffen. Oder Urs?

Ja, noch besser schräg von vorn.  Eine Gefechtssituation, in der einem Höchstfahrt laufenden Zerstörer ein Torpedo hinterher geschossen wird, ist kaum vorstellbar und würde auch zu Recht als "Verschwendung" kritisiert.

@doveton

The fact is, no situation arose during the latter half of 1940 which required the RN to operate in the Channel in daytime. 

I agree wholeheartedly with all your comments on materiel, personnel and leadership, but, as far as I recall, the coastal convoys on the South coast were suspended during that timeframe, thus avoiding a situation which would have required the RN to operate in the Channel in daytime (to cover them).

Gruß, Urs

[mhorgran]

@Dirk

Durch kurzfristige außer Dienststellung der beschädigten schweren Einheiten wäre durchaus genügend Personal zV gestanden.

[Doveton]

moin,



@doveton

The fact is, no situation arose during the latter half of 1940 which required the RN to operate in the Channel in daytime. 

I agree wholeheartedly with all your comments on materiel, personnel and leadership, but, as far as I recall, the coastal convoys on the South coast were suspended during that timeframe, thus avoiding a situation which would have required the RN to operate in the Channel in daytime (to cover them).

Gruß, Urs

Sorry, perhaps I did not make my earlier comments clear enough. What I was trying to say was that there was no reason for RN warships to operate in the Channel in daylight unless suitable targets ( by which I mean German warships or transports ) were detected. Wisely, the Kriegsmarine did not attempt to carry out such operations, because they were unwilling to risk exposing their vessels to the RN.

Similarly, the RN warships were there for one purpose only, to intercept the Sealion barges if/when they set out, and exposing them to unnessary risk from aerial attack was avoidable when a simple solution, that of sending the collier convoys through at night, was readily available.

I would suggest that both sides acted logically. The Luftwaffe launched Kanalkampf in an attempt to draw Fighter Command into battle prematurely, which failed when Dowding declined to be drawn into an attritional battle over the convoys, and the RN, aware that fighter cover would not be available and not wishing to commit valuable destroyers to the protection of small coasters and colliers moving at little more than five or six knots, simply changed the scheduling of the convoys. The shortcomings of the anti-aircraft weaponry fitted to RN destroyers at this stage of the war are well documented, which meant that the best defence against aircraft available to them at the time was their speed and ability to make rapid course alterations. Similarly, the difficulties even experienced Ju87 pilots found in hitting warships at speed are well documented, in particular the reports made by Major Dinort to his superiors at the time.

Perhaps if, as Mr. Leander claims, the Germans were the professionals and the British the amateurs in the Channel in 1940, he would explain why the historical record does not contain dozens of accounts of the night-time convoys being intercepted and destroyed by German warships! The fact is, that both the British and the Germans were professionals and were well aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective forces, and both acted in accordance with that knowledge.

[Doveton]

hi, Fred,

It does sound incredible but I believe only one of them survived 1942.

well, I believe you are wrong, IMO these are the facts (I hope Doveton agrees  )
- Tribals : 2 were lost before September 1940, 3 in 1941, 7 in 1942 (4 in the Med) and 4 survived the war
- "J" : 5 were lost in 1941/1942, and 2 survived the war
- "K" : 1 was lost before September 1940, 5 were lost in 1941/1942 (all in the Med), and 2 survived the war

greetings, Urs

To be strictly accurate, in September 1940 there were 18 of the big modern destroyers ( i.e., Tribal, J, & K Classes) operational in Home Waters, based at Rosyth, Scapa Flow, and the Humber. I have therefore excluded vessels of these classes either refitting, repairing, or in the Mediterranean.

Of these 18, five survived the war ( three Tribals, one K and one J ).

Of the 13 which were sunk, one was torpedoed by a Japanese destroyer, two by U-Boats, four sunk by bombing, two foundered whilst under tow following U-Boat torpedo damage, one was sunk by coastal batteries, one was damaged by surface action with Italian cruisers and subsequently torpedoed by an Italian aircraft, one damaged by bombing and scuttled, and one sunk in collision with the Battleship King George V.

I am not sure what relevance this has to Operation Sealion, but it does demonstrate that it is important always to check what Mr. Leander presents as facts!!

[Bergedorf]

@Dirk

Durch kurzfristige außer Dienststellung der beschädigten schweren Einheiten wäre durchaus genügend Personal zV gestanden.

Nein! Das wurde alles schon durchgeführt. Da war kein Raum mehr.... schau Dir mal die Original-Dokumente in Freiburg an (oder wir hatten hier im Forum gerade ein KTB einer der Schwestern (Scharnhost/Gneisenau), wo es auch klar war, dass die bis zur Grenze von Personal beraubt worden sind.

Und Personal war mit eine der Hauptgründe ,dass Seelöwe zurückgeführt wurde... weil sonst die U-Boot-Ausbildung gelitten hätte.

Gruß

Dirk

[Bergedorf]

@Dirk

Durch kurzfristige außer Dienststellung der beschädigten schweren Einheiten wäre durchaus genügend Personal zV gestanden.

Beleg mir dies bitte! Nach allen Quellen die ich gelesen habe, war da keine Reserve mehr...  (ich verkneif mir jetzt die Bemerkung über die Sekundärquelle die "bestimmt" mehr gewust hat als meine Primär-Quelle...")

Gruß

Dirk

[Huszar]

Good Morning,

@Doveton:
I have to confess, I'm rather in the pro-party regarding possible outcome for Seelöwe, however, I think Leandros gone too far in his assesment. On the other hand, I also think, the mainstream-assesment regarding the UK dispositions and chances are equally overoptimistic.

In effect, the Royal Navy would have bear the blunt of stopping Seelöwe, since neither the Army, nor the RAF would have enough strength to stop it. They could only slow it down, but the RN would have to stop it.

However, I'm quite skeptical about the RN's chances to stop the invasion. (not so sceptical as Leandros, but skeptical enough).
1, in the event, the Luftwaffe can achieve air supperiority over the chanel (pre-requisite for ANY landing!), I'm quite sure, that the RN would have vacate Dover, Portsmouth, Portland and Sheerness (save some port-deffence drifters and motor boats). In this situation, there is a slim chance, the RN can in time reach the landing fleet
2, the actual disposition of the ships is still not really clear. There are some ships, which are listed in the coloured papers in a given location, but actually were on convoy-duty. (or the other way around). Where they effectively where, has to be questioned. Also, I made a spreadsheet to the east-coast-convoys escorts, there are a lot of holes in the official history (some ships escort two convoys at the same time, do nothing for two weeks, etc). If every ship listed for the given locations where in reality there, OR was operational, has to be researched according to the war diaries of the ships - and NOT according to the coloured papers.
3, if the RN enters the chanel in daylight, it will be anihilated for little or no gain at all. And, the famed Sheerness-Fleet has to enter the chanel in broad daylight, since only in the morning is it clear, where the invasion is taking place.
4, the RAF has no means to give continous mass CAP for the destroyers, AND perform every other task arrises (shoot down transport-planes, bombers, protect its own bombers and ground troops). If there were no other tasks, the Luftwaffe could muster more fighters at every given point, than the CAP could.

And a nice question to all the contra-party:
Are 5 BBs, 10 CAs, 2 CLs and 15 DDs enough to wipe out a lightly defended invasion fleet? 

mfg

alex

PS: sorry for the probably poor English

[Knouterer]

Re: Torpedos gegen Destroyer: ich verstehe wirklich nicht was das wüste Geschimpfe soll, jedesmal wenn ich eine technische Bemerkung mache. NATÜRLICH sollen Torpedoangriffe idealiter von der Seite oder schräg von Vorne stattfinden, und nicht von hinten, aber es ist eben immer sehr viel schwieriger ein schnelles bewegliches Ziel zu treffen als ein langsames oder unbewegliches. Eine grössere Geschwindigkeit des benutzten Projektils hilft da schon sehr, weshalb z.B. auch beim entwurf von Flugzeugabwehrkanonen immer versucht wurde die höchstmögliche Mündungsgeschwindigkeit zu erreichen (auch wenn das u.A. eine extrem schnelle Abnutzung des Rohres verursachte).
Alles klar?
In unserem Szenario würden die Destroyer auf der Suche nach einem Geleitzug wohl mit ziemlich hoher Geschwindigkeit unterwegs sein, und ich stelle also fest das der Kommandant eines S-Bootes/U-Bootes nur mit sehr viel Geschick und vor allem Glück einen Torpedotreffer hätte landen können. 

[kgvm]

Destroyer losses during Operation Dynamo: yes, (only) 6 (British) destroyers lost, but there were a good number damaged, which couldn't operate the next days, weeks or even month. Same results versus destroyers attacking the German Sealion-convoys would keep a good number of them from returning to attack the German Sealion-convoys.

On the other hand:
Operation Dynamo has proven that even in May/June there were many days the Luftwaffe couldn't operate at all or at least the full day because the weather didn't permit to attack ships. So in September very probably there would have been days British attackers didn't have to fear the Luftwaffe - and defending the convoys with only the few German surface units ....

[Knouterer]

Kleines Rechenbeispiel: Ein U-Boot ist am S-1 unter Wasser mit sagen wir 8 Knoten auf Periskoptiefe unterwegs. Auf einmal sieht der Kommandant auf nur 1000 m direkt vor ihm ein Destroyer, von links (Backbordseite, sorry ...) kommend, der seinen Kurs im 90° Winkel schneidet. Grosses Waidmannsglück !!! Feuer !!!

Aber wenn der Destroyer auch nur halb so schnell ist wie der Torpedo, ist er schon 500 m weiter wenn der Torpedo seine ursprüngliche Position erreicht. Also muss der U-Boot-Kommandant nach rechts abdrehen und ... ja wie viel denn? 600 m doch schon? haben wir Zeit zum rechnen?  ... vorhalten, feuern und das beste hoffen.
 

[mhorgran]

@Dirk

Durch kurzfristige außer Dienststellung der beschädigten schweren Einheiten wäre durchaus genügend Personal zV gestanden.

Beleg mir dies bitte! Nach allen Quellen die ich gelesen habe, war da keine Reserve mehr... 

Schenk "Landung in England" Seiten 390-395.

(ich verkneif mir jetzt die Bemerkung über die Sekundärquelle die "bestimmt" mehr gewust hat als meine Primär-Quelle...")

Du verkneifst dir eine Bemerkung die du dir doch nicht verkneifst? 
Mensch Mädl 

[AndreasB]

If every ship listed for the given locations where in reality there, OR was operational, has to be researched according to the war diaries of the ships - and NOT according to the coloured papers.

And the problem we have there is that the log books of the destroyer fleet is no longer in existence. The story one of the staff members (!) at Kew told me was that when they were to be shipped from the Admiralty to the PRO, the pallettes had a large sign stuck onto them, indicating the class of vessel. That for the destroyers simply said "Destr.", so the files were destroyed. He cautioned he didn't know if that was true, but I have been unable to find any destroyer war diaries at Kew.

All the best

Andreas

Ps. bear the brunt, not blunt.

[Leandros]

Good Morning,


In effect, the Royal Navy would have bear the blunt of stopping Seelöwe, since neither the Army, nor the RAF would have enough strength to stop it. They could only slow it down, but the RN would have to stop it.
, where the invasion is taking place.


PS: sorry for the probably poor English

Your English is fine! Take it from a Norwegian living in Sweden......

Your conclusion above is interesting for a very special reason. The British Leadership did not agree as definitely on their defense strategy as we have been led to believe. There were powers in the Navy that opinionated that it was the army's mission to stop, and throw back, an invasion. The Navy's main purpose was the securing of the ocean supply lines to the Kingdom. Certainly, nothing wrong with the fighting spirit of the crews themselves but there were some in the naval leadership that focused a little further than the tip of their noses. Besides, the Luftwaffe had given them a terrible scare. 

The Army leadership had switched from a forward (Ironside) to a retreated (Alanbrooke) strategy based on the use of mobile reserves. General Halder liked that. His opinion on the British maneuver capabilities was - low. He says so in his diaries. With the fact that a large part of the British army was based North of London/Thames Estuary (they still saw their East Coast as a possible invasion area), the whole strategy takes on a certain resemblance of all the other British retreats of the period, Norway, Belgium/France, Africa (yes, they were at first thrown back by the Italians), Greece, Crete and - Singapore.

Alanbrooke might even have discarded the forward strategy because of the attitude showed by the naval leaders. He does mention his doubts about the Navy in his diary. A fighting withdrawal to a Bristol-London line could have saved the British Army from disaster. To stand and fight in the South they might have been destroyed together with the Navy.

The RAF? Dowding was still heading the Fighter Command and his main target up till then had been the upholding of his force to fight another day. A Seelöwe would take him back to the period before Gøring saved him by switching his priorities to London.

For those interested I have put another no-reserve auction for my book on eBay. Here is the link - happy bidding:

http://www.ebay.com/itm/280821331189?ssPageName=STRK:MESELX:IT&_trksid=p3984.m1555.l2649

[Doveton]

Good Morning,

@Doveton:
I have to confess, I'm rather in the pro-party regarding possible outcome for Seelöwe, however, I think Leandros gone too far in his assesment. On the other hand, I also think, the mainstream-assesment regarding the UK dispositions and chances are equally overoptimistic.

In effect, the Royal Navy would have bear the blunt of stopping Seelöwe, since neither the Army, nor the RAF would have enough strength to stop it. They could only slow it down, but the RN would have to stop it.

However, I'm quite skeptical about the RN's chances to stop the invasion. (not so sceptical as Leandros, but skeptical enough).
1, in the event, the Luftwaffe can achieve air supperiority over the chanel (pre-requisite for ANY landing!), I'm quite sure, that the RN would have vacate Dover, Portsmouth, Portland and Sheerness (save some port-deffence drifters and motor boats). In this situation, there is a slim chance, the RN can in time reach the landing fleet
2, the actual disposition of the ships is still not really clear. There are some ships, which are listed in the coloured papers in a given location, but actually were on convoy-duty. (or the other way around). Where they effectively where, has to be questioned. Also, I made a spreadsheet to the east-coast-convoys escorts, there are a lot of holes in the official history (some ships escort two convoys at the same time, do nothing for two weeks, etc). If every ship listed for the given locations where in reality there, OR was operational, has to be researched according to the war diaries of the ships - and NOT according to the coloured papers.
3, if the RN enters the chanel in daylight, it will be anihilated for little or no gain at all. And, the famed Sheerness-Fleet has to enter the chanel in broad daylight, since only in the morning is it clear, where the invasion is taking place.
4, the RAF has no means to give continous mass CAP for the destroyers, AND perform every other task arrises (shoot down transport-planes, bombers, protect its own bombers and ground troops). If there were no other tasks, the Luftwaffe could muster more fighters at every given point, than the CAP could.

And a nice question to all the contra-party:
Are 5 BBs, 10 CAs, 2 CLs and 15 DDs enough to wipe out a lightly defended invasion fleet? 

mfg

alex

PS: sorry for the probably poor English

Good afternoon,

Firstly, there is nothing wrong with your English. It is far superior to my German, and easily understood.

As you have gathered, I am convinced that Sealion never had a hope of success. The fact is that the Luftwaffe in 1940 was neither trained nor equipped to attack ships at sea. At Dunkirk, for example, despite Goering's assertion that 'This is a job for the Luftwaffe', and with most factors in their favour ( ships moving slowly in crowded waters and with their decks crammed with soldiers, restricting the operations of AA gun crews ), only four of the forty or so RN destroyers present were sunk by air attack, and all of these were stationary when hit.

Churchill was correct in his comment that 'wars are not won by evacuations' but the fact is that the Luftwaffe failed utterly, and the RN were able to lift virtually the whole of the BEF & French troops out of the Dunkirk pocket, whilst incurring warships losses well within acceptable levels. Nor can the argument that many destroyers were put out of action be sustained; only three of the damaged vessels were not back with the fleet by 18 June.

Certainly, Luftwaffe commanders such as von Richthoven and Dinort were convinced that protection of the Sealion convoys was a task beyond the ability of the Luftwaffe, and were quite outspoken in this view. If the Luftwaffe could not inflict heavy casualties on the RN destroyers at Dunkirk, then it is highly unlikely that they would have had much success against those same vessels when, with adequate sea room, they were free to manouevre at speeds of 25 to 30 knots. Furthermore, for at least half of the time (i.e., the night) the RN was free to operate against the invasion forces unimpeded by air attack.

I feel that you do not give enough credit to the RN Pink Lists, which listed the location and operational status of every major RN warship. This was, in effect, the RN's Order of Battle, and it was essential that it should be accurate. Obviously, this does not mean that a vessel shown as being at, for example, Plymouth, was actually tied up against the harbour wall at the time, but it does mean that it was not away on convoy duty, as vessels detached for such operations were listed separately.

The List of 16 September has been readily available for some time, and I did considerable research into it some time ago as part of my degree. I can only give you my word for this, but I was impressed by how accurate it was.

In conclusion, I believe that, like every 'What If', we can never know what would really have happened, but I feel it must be considered significant that every German Naval officer connected with Sealion who expressed an opinion regarded it as a potential disaster in the making, and Raeder, in particular, was eager to ensure that it was never attempted.

Finally, I ought to point out that the RN never intended to send the Battleships and Heavy Cruisers of the Home Fleet against Sealion, but had assembled a force of some 70 destroyers and cruisers, supported by several hundred lighter vessels, to intercept the invasion convoys en route. As a dawn invasion was intended, the initial interception would have taken place at night.

A typical RN destroyer of 1939-40 mounted four four inch or 4.7 inch guns and if fully armed carried 170 rounds of ammunition per gun. I therefore submit that this force was indeed capable of reducing the invasion convoys to a bloody shambles, but, as I said earlier, the invasion was never attempted so my submission, thankfully, will never be put to the test!  

[Knouterer]

On the subject of torpedo attacks, it occurs to me that the barge fleets, after they had turned towards the beach, would have been the ideal target. Any RN sub, destroyer or MTB within range could have fired off its torpedoes across the front of the advancing formations (perhaps slightly angled towards them) without having to aim at anything in particular; a miss would have been (theoretically) impossible, because if the first tug/barge combination in the wide front didn't run into the torp, the tenth, or the twenty-seventh, would.

But of course somebody will soon explain that this could never have happened because in September 1940 the entire RN was vacationing in Barbados.