22.5.1941 Kreta

[igor]

Both KG 30 and KG 3 was present on theatre and both not included VIII fliegerkorps. But KG 3 present in report times from times and KG 30 is not present. However i think KG 30 attack is not one on 08.05. This attack of KG 3 according to report, was headed to cruisers and destroyers only, not BB.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Thank you Igor. A further detail is fixed.

      Enrico

[Spee]

Servus,

KG 30? I believe, this unit wasn't in this theatre before 1942.
The morning attacks against "Naiad" and "Carlisle" were flown by Ju 88 from LG1 and Do 17 from KG 2.
The BB was "Warspite",  attacked around 13.15 from Ju 87 (maybe StG 2), Me 109 from JG 77 and Me 110 from ZG 26.


EDIT: German and italian units

Stab,I,III/KG2 Do l7Z at Menidi
III/KG3 Do l7Z at Menidi
I,II/LG1 Ju88A at Eleusis
II/KG26 Hel 111 at Eleusis
Stab,II/StG1 Ju87B at Argos
Stab,I/StG2 Ju87B at Molaoi and Mycene
III/StG2 Ju87B at Scarpanto
I/StG3 Ju87B at Argos
I,II,III/StG77 Ju87B at Argos
Stab,I,II/ZG26 Bf 110 at Argos
II/ZG76 Bf 110 at Argos
II,III/JG77 Bf 109 at Molaoi
I(J)/LG2 Bf 109 at Molaoi
2(F)/11 Do 17P, Hs 126A
2/SeeaufklGr126 He 60 at Scaramanga
Seenotdienststaffel 7 Do 24 at Scaramanga
7(F)/LG2 Bf 110
Aufkl Staffel XI Fliegerkorps (detached) Bf 110

39° Stormo:
92° Gruppo BT (200a, 201a Squadriglia) S.79 Gadurra, Rhodes
41° Gruppo AS (204a, 205a Squadriglia) S.84 Gadurra, Rhodes
281a Squadriglia Autonomo AS S.79sil Gadurra, Rhodes
50° Gruppo Autonomo BT (210a, 211a Squadriglia) Z.1007bis Maritza, Rhodes
172a Squadriglia RT Z.1007bis Maritza, Rhodes
161a Squadriglia Autonomo CM Ro.43/Ro.44 Leros
162a Squadriglia Autonomo CT CR42 Scarpanto
163a Squadriglia Autonomo CT CR32/CR42 Gadurra, Rhodes
Sezzione Soccorso Z.506B Rhodes

[igor]

As Enrico wrote, KG 30 fly from Sizilia. III/KG 30 based at Gambrini that time.
Group with BB (german designation II) was attacked by StG 2 in 06.30 in qu 24 46. 3 hits was claimed.

[Spee]

@Igor,

your'e right, III/KG30 was at Gerbini at this time.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Hello Gentlemen,

it's now the time to examinate what happened at 9.14. One of the two torpedoes exploded in the cruiser's wake causing minor internal damage in the aft area, like for orion the night before.

The other one, according the then Lt. (E) Louis Le Bailly, later chief of the Corps, who was the responsable for the hull of HMS Naiad, wrote in his self biography "The man behind the Engine", that: "...one air-launched torpedo passed harmlessy under our stern. Another had punched a hole through our stem without exploding".

As we know no Axis aircraft dropped a torpedo that day and that no Italian submarine launched too or was lost that day the only two torpedoes in the water were the ones from Sagittario.

The 450 mm hole in the stern along the port side changed, of course, the solid geometry of that ship which was running at 28 knots. The stop had to be a very rude one and Naiad turned them, suddenly, disappearing from the Italian torpedo boat sight.
Then, at 9.24 the torpedo head, labelled in the attached British reports as a not very probable "Delayed action bomb off Port beam of Naiad" exploded. The cone of the detonation slabbered the opposite side causing what Le Bailly again described as a "...huge hole for'd" which was repaired later at Alexandria, with the help of a Repair Ship "...welding a great plate over the huge hole" during the 21 days spent there for temporary repairs, a task which was obviously much more important than the remedy for a mere 450 mm punch.
The endeavour to avoid the explosion allowed Ordnance Artificer (4th class) J. Bache of that ship to get the C.G.M. for his bravery.
The damages at the fore end below and above the waterline, were reminded in the a.m. PRO ADM234/444 and caused Naiad to be partially flooded forward of 34 bulkhead. A reduction of speed occurred and when the ship was back at Alex she was, according Le Bailly: "...well down by bows".

The unfortunate Naiad was then alone when the German sombers attacked it since 9.27 when the first bombs fell 50 yards from the ship. During the following 80 minutes that cruiser would have totalled, accoring that British report, about 139 bombs around her. As the Ju 88 carried four bombs (4 x 250 or 2 x 500 + 2 x 250) it would have been necessary, given the a.m. reminded 33 crews, all the aircrafts had chose that warship, but we know five at least dropped against Sagittario, luckly with no effect, and that (from Luftwaffe Aces, page 20) that: "When Hoffmann learned that some of his aircrafts had not dropped their bombs he ordered a continuation of the attack. Reinforced by Do-17Z bombers (or were they Do 217? I would like a confirmation, please) of the 2nd Bomb Wing, they flew soutwest after the withdrawing warships and attacked a second time". We know, then, HMS carlisle received two direct hits and two near misses which caused one month of time out of actions for repairs, so once again the report attached at HMS Naiad's log is grossly exagerated according the British proverb created after the Jutland battle "To lie like a bullettin".

The Ju 88 achieved near misses at 10.40, causing with their splinters a casualty in an aft tower, 11.16, 11.20 putting the High Angle Director out of business and flooding the Small Arms Magazine and the Topman's Mess Deck. The real problem, however, was that, as Le Bailly wrote, the hatches were open (a party of Sea Scouts would have been more professional), while the bow damage brought Naiad down forward allowing more water to pour through the the splinter holes (more than 400 were later counted). Auxiliary machinery castings were fractured too.

At least the reminder of Force C arrived to support, by 10.34, that lone cruiser. The German air attacks (Naiad was machine gunned too by some Ju 88 at h 10.30) were anyway pursued for a total of about 3,5 hours ending with the sinking of the DD Greyhound. During the afternoon it was the time, after a lapse, of Gloucester and Fiji.

More later

Enrico     

           

           
               

[Spee]

Hi Enrico,

KG 2 and 3 was equipped at this time with Do 17 Z.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

This story can, at least, suggest some conclusions.

Rear Admiral King and HMS Naiad's captain and crew commited plenty of blunders that day, from the brilliant idea to betray, at night, the squadron's position for nothing to the careless to be sighted forst by the small Sagittario until the mistake made by the whole Force C not to note the launching of her torpedoes. They were a little overconfident and paid the related price (five deads and 49 wounded).

King then lied in his report stating there were German aitr attacks which never happened, describing non existent torpedo bombers everywhere and increasing by a factro 3 or 4 the bombs which dropped around his flagships. Some of these facts could be the effect of mistakes (Le Bailly wrote that "The officer detailed to broadcast a running commentary suffered a breakdown during th ebattle and we heard little below"), but their sum can be described with only one word: fabrication.

The report later materialized in the London Gazette then, and used later by the various writers, said Sagittario run away and totally forgotten the gun action between that torpedo boat and HMS Kipling.

In Italian a proverb says "Le bugie hanno le gambe corte" (lies have shor legs). I would like to know the equivalent German sentence.
Admiral Cunningham himself in a report of his (PRO ADM 199/679 n. Med./00252/3 1 Jan. 1042) to the Admiralty admitted HMS Kingston had suffered some minor damages by 3.9 shells.
Then, on 1971, as Vincent P. O'Hara discovered and wrote in his excellent "Struggle for the Middle Sea", Jack S. Harker in his "Well Done Leander", wrote: "Those on deck that afternoon (21 June 1941) watched Naiad enter Haifa with something new, technicolor camouflage. Her usual black, grey and light grey pattern was now augmented for'ard with a hihe splash of red where her repairs had yet to be finally painted. She'd been torpedoed off Crete, hastly repaired in dock at Alexandria and left Haifa again at duck ahead of Leander with a an eight destroyer escort".

Admiral Cunningham was not pleased with King who had missed his target, the convoy, and even if propaganda dicated to accept his fair tale for Home's morale and to give him the MID for "Withdrawl from Crete", sacked him sending that Rear Admiral back to the Admiralty where he become Assistant Chief of the Nvaal Staff (Trade). he retired on 1944.

After the war the old propaganda themes, which stated the Royal Navy faced single-handed the Italian one without any problem were not modified, but become "The truth" in spite of the many gaps of the "official stories" like the ones during the Action off Calabria on 1940, Pantelleria on 1942 ect.
Such a curious state of affair is still enduring today. I presume old Doctor Freud would consider such an escape from reality the finest inferiority complex of his career.

Any suggestion is welcome, folks

         Sincerely

          Enrico    

         

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Thank you Spee, I would love you will be the first of many.

   Enrico

[Urs Heßling]

hello,

The endeavour to avoid the explosion allowed Ordnance Artificer (4th class) J. Bache of that ship to get the C.G.M. for his bravery.please)  

CGM = Conspicious Gallantry Medal, siehe http://www.victoriacross.org.uk/aagloss.htm

In Italian a proverb says "Le bugie hanno le gambe corte" (lies have short legs). I would like to know the equivalent German sentence.

the same: "Lügen haben kurze Beine"

to give him the MID for "Withdrawl from Crete",

als Erklärung für unsere "Abkürzung-Fans" ...
"MID" steht für "Mention in Dispatches" , wurde/wird in GB wie ein "niedriger" Orden angesehen, das (damalige) deutsche Äquivalent - sinngemäß, aber nicht auf gleichem Niveau - wäre "Nennung im Wehrmachtsbericht".

one minuscule question ...

The report later materialized in the London Gazette then, and used later by the various writers, said Sagittario run away and totally forgotten the gun action between that torpedo boat and HMS Kipling. 

HMS Kingston ?

Gruß, Urs

[Leandros]

Very nice work, Enrico!

But how do you explain that the penetrating torpedo dud, positioned in the aft of the ship, made a large hole in the forward of the ship when it went off?

Regds

Fred

[igor]

"Bericht..." has mention about claim to hit one cruiser by T-boat torpedo and stated, that it was later not confirmed. (after POW from GREYHOUND interrogations, i think).
Planes widely uses 50-kg bobms, not only 250 and 500. This may lead to hundred explosions around NAYAD.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Hello Gentlemen.

the torpedo dud hit the stem, not the stern, so the blowing bow is correct.

Yes, it was Kingston, not Kipling. a lapsus of mine.

Greyhound was sailing with Gloucester and Fiji and no Italian torpedo was involved against them that day. Those sailors could say only what did they know, i.e. nothing.

Ju 88 A could have been armed with then 110-lb SC 50 bombs internally and 4 551.lb SC 250 or two 1105 lb Sc 500 internally or four ones externally. Any info about the types of ordnance dropped that day would be welcome.

   Enrico

[Leandros]

Hello Gentlemen.

the torpedo dud hit the stem, not the stern, so the blowing bow is correct.

Enrico

Sorry, may fault - makes more sense........I would like to post a link to this thread on ArmchairGeneralForum. Would you mind..?

Fred

[Dimitris Galon]

Does anybody have maps from the war diaries (German and English) regarding the battle on the 22nd May 1941?

Thanks in advance
DG