Seelöwe

[Kosmos]

BoB was preparation for Seelöwe, Luftwaffe had to neutralise RAF because it is very difficult simultaneously to fight of british bombers attacking german landing craft, attack british warships steaming to canal and to provide close air support.
But Luftwaffe even failed to destroy RAF as it, Luftwaffe, was able to concentrate completely on that task. So no doubt, Luftwaffe would fail by attempt to solve tasks which are more ambitious.

[Leandros]

BoB was preparation for Seelöwe, Luftwaffe had to neutralise RAF because it is very difficult simultaneously to fight of british bombers attacking german landing craft, attack british warships steaming to canal and to provide close air support.
But Luftwaffe even failed to destroy RAF as it, Luftwaffe, was able to concentrate completely on that task. So no doubt, Luftwaffe would fail by attempt to solve tasks which are more ambitious.

While BoB was supposed to be a preparation for Seelöwe the Luftwaffe mostly flew missions which were of little use to it, and not against Royal Navy installations and vessels, except in the first part, the Kanalkampf. The Kriegsmarine complained about this several times to the OKW and Hitler. If Seelöwe had been given a go-ahead, say on Sept. 17th, Luftwaffe would have to act according to the specific orders for Seelöwe which were very different from those actually flown.  According to these orders S-8 to S-1 missions should be flown against the RN, S-1 against infrastructure, troop concentrations and communications. On S-day priority was to support the landings. However, on both sides of the Channel were LW units specifically earmarked for protection against RN intrusions. As a matter of fact all LW units had this as their first priority. While few believe the RAF, under the prevailing conditions, could do much against the landing fleet itself, their primary mission would be to keep the German bombers away from the RN vessels.

[t-geronimo]

This is for the british fighters.
What about the bombers? If I am correct they played little or no role during the BoB (counter-attacks on german airfields or so). Where they still in service or were the pilots used for flying fighters? (I don't know much about air warfare.)
In case of a german invasion they would have been put in service, I guess. So roles of the fighters on both sides would have to be devided: guard the own bombers and defend the own ships.
How would both sides have managed that? Was it practicable or would one side be soon out of pilots/planes to perform both tasks?

[Huszar]

Actually, since the RAF had fewer fighters than the LW, gues the outcome 

[Leandros]

This is for the british fighters.
What about the bombers? If I am correct they played little or no role during the BoB (counter-attacks on german airfields or so). Where they still in service or were the pilots used for flying fighters? (I don't know much about air warfare.)
In case of a german invasion they would have been put in service, I guess. So roles of the fighters on both sides would have to be devided: guard the own bombers and defend the own ships.
How would both sides have managed that? Was it practicable or would one side be soon out of pilots/planes to perform both tasks?

Some considerations on the probable development of the air fighting over the Channel. A small extract from my upcoming book on the subject:

During the Dunkirk evacuation Fighter Command had to fly standing
patrols over Dunkirk; otherwise, it would have taken too
long to respond to developing Luftwaffe attacks. This is a very
uneconomical use of air power, and the British fighters had no
possibility of being present at all times in any strength. If the British
naval units were to operate in the Channel during daytime, they
would be dependant on the same type of standing patrols because
of the distance to the fighter bases. The coastal airfields, Manston,
Hawkinge and Lympne, would probably have been destroyed,
captured, or at least incapacitated. From this we can conclude that
Fighter Command, assisted by its radar system, was more efficient
against deep intrusions, attacks on inland airfields, communications,
and army and supply concentrations, particularly if the enemy
bombers were not escorted. Fighter Command's efficiency as a
protector against bombing raids successively diminished with the
distance from their bases. Royal Navy units operating in the Channel
would therefore necessarily operate with very uncertain fighter cover,
sometimes being protected, sometimes not. Even when protected
there was no guarantee that they actually were so if the Luftwaffe
bomber escort was strong enough.

A parameter that is seldom considered, quite strangely, is the fact
that after an eventual invasion most of the British radar chain would
have gone down because the radar towers were placed close to the
coast. The Germans tried to destroy these by bombing during the
summer of 1940 but were not successful. The stations were quickly
on the air again, so the attacks were given up. It also seems as if
the Germans did not quite understand the importance of the radar
chain. Another theory is that they did not mind it because one of their
intentions really was to draw Fighter Command to them to better be
able to destroy it. During a landing these radar installations would
have been physically overrun since their locations were well within
the area that was to be taken by the German ground forces during the
first day. This would have influenced enormously the British fighter
defense of southern England!

[Leandros]

Some thoughts on the Type M35 minesweeper:


Type M35 minesweeper – a viable fighting ship....?

I have already pointed you gentlemen's attention to the German Type M35 minesweeper as a viable combat and escort ship. The more so as 19 of these were available for Operation Sea Lion and would have been there - and then – when the invasion actually took place, as opposed to the hundred-some RN vessels which were other places.

The specific reason for not accepting my opinion has often been that its (M35's) artillery had to fire in local control, in lack of a Fire Control System. I am not sure how much importance this would have in a nocturnal short-range skirmish in the Channel – I should think the quality of the optics perhaps would be more important. However, I have found that the M35 actually had a Fire Control position at the bridge, with a dedicated Fire Control Officer (Leiter Artillerigeschütze) who worked with the operator of the 3-meter rangefinder in the same position. The AAA in the aft had its own dedicated 1,5 meter rangefinder. So, there was an alternative to firing in local control, whatever it was worth. Furthermore, I suspect that the MPL (Mittel Positon Lavette) of its 10,5 cm. guns had a certain amount of vertical stabilization, which is not unimportant in a fighting ship. I shall come back on that. They also had 240 rounds of ammunition to each gun and a trained crew could (theoretically) get off 15 rounds a minute. Which I believe is rather equal to similar RN guns. The biography of a German sailor (engineer, actually) that served on board the M35's also states that while its rated speed was 18, 2 knots they could push it up to 21 knots in an emergency, which isn't important in this context other than when they needed to switch fast between escort mission areas. Needless to say, built for minesweeping, they were sturdy ships and very seaworthy. The basic hull construction was split in 12 individually watertight compartments.

As you might know 69 M35's served in different sort of roles all through the war, minesweeping, mine-laying, escort, AA defense and as sub-chasers in Biscaya, The Channel, North Sea, Baltic and the Polar Sea. It participated in the Polish campaign, Weserübung, Barbarossa and The Channel Dash. Its most prominent role was as a minesweeper and escort for the many coastal convoys between North Cape and the Spanish border. It was in the forefront from the start. Even then the first M35 wasn't lost in enemy action (except mines) until May 1942, when M256 was bombed outside Cherbourg. The first loss by surface action wasn't until May 1943 as M8 was attacked by four MTB's off Hoek van Holland, which is only to show that MTB's were dangerous to larger enemies as was proved by the several RN and French destroyers sunk by the German S-boats earlier in the war. So, until RAF received their rocket-armed Hurries, Beaus and Mossies, and RN had radar-equipped vessels, the M35's went largely scot-free up and down the Channel night after night.

There's another aspect to be considered with these vessels. They, as the German destroyer and T-boat flotillas, operated in very distinct flotillas where they had the opportunity to be excellently tuned-up as operative units. The minesweeping in itself was a typical teamwork which demanded a high degree of cooperation. These flotillas really knew how to work together, which is probably why so many survived for so long. Since very few of them ever received radar equipment their disadvantage in the field increased markedly as more and more RN vessels got this and larger enemy destroyer types, even cruisers, were freed up for Channel service. 

But that was years after 1940......

[Bergedorf]

Hi Fred,

you know that the M 35 of i.e. Transportflotte B had to sweep mines with ca. 10kn before the the Tranportflotte witch was sailing with ca. 5kn?? There will be big gaps between the Minesweepers and the Tranportflotte and you will be hamperd with minesweeping gear outside.

Regards

Dirk

P.S.: Zur Luftwaffe äußere ich mich noch mal wenn ich mehr Zeit habe. Fakt ist, dass die Luftwaffe in der Phase wo sie gegen die brit. Flugplätze operiert hatte sogar ein schlechteres Verlustverhältnis hatte als in der Zeit wo es gegen London ging.

[Leandros]

Hi Fred,

you know that the M 35 of i.e. Transportflotte B had to sweep mines with ca. 10kn before the the Tranportflotte witch was sailing with ca. 5kn?? There will be big gaps between the Minesweepers and the Tranportflotte and you will be hamperd with minesweeping gear outside.

Regards

Dirk

Thank you. I do not have the exact organizing of the escorts for Transportflotte B. According to Klee "B" was also assigned 4. M.-Flotilla (7 Type M16 ships), 18. M.-flotilla (7 auxilliary minesweepers) as well as 3rd (8 R-boats) and 11th. R.-Flotilla  (8 auxilliaries). Finally 2 VP-Flotillas (18 boats). Some of these should land soldiers from the vorausabteilungen, among those the M35's. This implies they were not to be used for sweeping.

[Bergedorf]

Hi Fred,

the use of 3. MS-Fl. for Minesweeping was Ordered by Operationsbefehl No. 1 on 14th September 1940 by Seebefehlshaber West (VAdm Lütjens).

I have to correct the speed of the Minesweeping Forces: They should move with 8kn.

4. MS-Fl. should protect Geleitzug 2 from Rotterdamm. It would not be with the Barges

18 MS.Fl was assigned to Transportflotte D. I think you are speeking of 16. MS-Fl. witch was assigned to Geleitzug 1 from Ostende. This one would go with Geleitzug 2 and would arrive on Beach B 2h after the S-Time.

In direct touch with the Barges would therfore be:
11. R-Fl. (some little Fishing Boats with one or two MGs)
3. Vp-Fl.
3. R-Fl.
2. Vp-Fl.

and the 3. MS-Fl. would move before this fleet to sweep mines and to land soldiers (they should also lay bouyages, and one Boat serves as commanding Boat for leader Transportflotte B and Commanding General AOK XIII).

The Transport fleet would move into range of the CHL-Radar and would hit the MS (b) Mine-Barrage. It would be in Range of the Dover Coast Artillery latest from the turning point at the Varne Lightvessel. If the deep minefields of the Folkestone-Griz Nez Barrage would hamper this force is not really clear for me... there should be done some research. A chart from 1942 in the Staff History dealing with the Anti-Invasion Measures of the RN Shows a R-Mine-Trot Anti-Motor-Boat-Nets alon the Landing Beaches of Landezone B. If it was present in September 1940 (HMS Atalanta was on 23rd September in Newhaven and it was a Vessel specialized on laying this Net-Defences) I don´t know. But if it was, it would give some headache to the invader.

It is all not so easy as it seems...

Regards

Dirk

[Leandros]

Thank you! Very good information!

[Leandros]

Hi Fred,

The Transport fleet would move into range of the CHL-Radar and would hit the MS (b) Mine-Barrage. It would be in Range of the Dover Coast Artillery latest from the turning point at the Varne Lightvessel. If the deep minefields of the Folkestone-Griz Nez Barrage would hamper this force is not really clear for me... there should be done some research. A chart from 1942 in the Staff History dealing with the Anti-Invasion Measures of the RN Shows a R-Mine-Trot Anti-Motor-Boat-Nets alon the Landing Beaches of Landezone B. If it was present in September 1940 (HMS Atalanta was on 23rd September in Newhaven and it was a Vessel specialized on laying this Net-Defences) I don´t know. But if it was, it would give some headache to the invader.

It is all not so easy as it seems...

Regards

Dirk

Sorry, these I do not buy even if I can agree that sometimes things aren't as easy as they look....

[Bergedorf]

Hi Fred,

what is your problem with this passage of my last post?

[Huszar]

If I'm not wrong, the fleets should steer south of The Ridge, not north of the Varne (and so south of the minefield). The other thing is, that the British Übermenschen can do almost everything. Now they are truly capable of seriously impar the fleets with the coastal guns from Dover - 20+ km away, at night...

I have the strange feeling, that the "contra"-fraction seeks every opportunity to discredit the German part, and downplays the problems on the English side. Most of this arguments are somewhat khmmm... laughable. (Germany can not plant the requiered minefields with the 14 existing ships in 10 days, and if it is possible, the mines would be ineffective because of the tide, and if they are effective, the RN can sweep the fields in no time. If they are not swept, they are however to thin and/or are deterriorating on their own. The joke is, this applies only to the German fields and the German side, the RN can, of course, lay more mines, for which the tides are no problem, which the DKM cannot sweep, and which does not detorriorating n their own. But the same for the LW/RAF, DKM/RN etc)

However, this does not mean, that I regard an M35 as an effective fighting platform against destroyers 

mfg

alex

[Bergedorf]

Hi Alex,

sorry, but Transportflotte B should sail northwards of the Varne, and from Dover to the Varne Lightvessels it is about 10km. If the Coastal guns would have fired in the night, I don´t know. But the Geleitzüge would pass this point 1-2 hours after the barges, and this should be at dawn least. Winnie could easly reach the whole of landing beach B.

I have not told anything here about minelaying. Fact is that the weather between (as I remember) 12th September and 20th September was quite bad. You could verify this, when you read the KTB Skl. Another problem is, that it seams, that the Gezeitenminen EMG weren´t available in 1940. It is perfectly clear  that the british side would have many problems too, but at the monemt I am researching the german side (some 2.500 page will come from Freiburg next week ) ). The british side will follow in detail after this.

regards

Dirk

[Thoddy]

CH was some kind of dead end in technical development due to its long wavelenght. CH was only valuable at the water side and practicable blind at the rear side. The most advanced thing was the centralised communication room, wich enables the RAF to concentrate their Fighters at the required spot with sufficent warning time.