Seelöwe

[Matrose71]

@ Alex,

nur mal so als Frage, wenn die Engländer alles riskieren (POW Dänemarkstraße), kann das die KM doch auch.
Waren PE und BS schon fertig und in der Ausbildung? Könnte man die nicht auch rausziehen mit Scheer?

Lützow ist denke ich nicht fertig (Torpedotreffer)

Was ist mit SH und GN, können die bei Vorwarnzeit ausgedockt werden? Oder waren die Werftaufenthalte fundemental?
SH dürfte ihren Torpedotreffer doch schon repariert haben aus dem Glorious Gefecht?!

[Huszar]

Hallo, Carsten,

Beim B-Schiff und PE wäre ich skeptisch. Das B-SChiff wurde genau einem Monat vor Seelöwe iD gestellt, PE auch erst im August.

Die Schwestern waren mW bis Oktober/November in der Werft.

Ausserdem: wieso riskieren? 

mfg

alex

[Knouterer]

Wenn ich das noch mal überprüfe stimmt das mit zwei Nächte auf See für den Geleitzug aus Rotterdam in der Tat nicht genau, es waren 48 Stunden veranschlagt für das Auslaufen und die Flotte sollte sich etwa 18 Stunden vor S-Zeit komplett vor Hoek van Holland (Versammlungsraum I) gesammelt haben in und Marsch setzen. Ankunft vor Ort etwa 2 Stunden nach S-Zeit, die Schiffsbewegungen hätten also ingesamt 68 Stunden gedauert, ich bleibe mal dabei dass die RN Vorwarnung und Zeit genug gehabt hätte um den Geleitzug mit starken Kräften abzufangen.

Die KM wäre in der Tat kaum anwesend gewesen, die meiste Zerstörer überwachten den westlichen Kanalausgang, vor der holl./belgischen Küste wären es höchstens zwei gewesen, plus S-Boote, U-Boote und Kleinkram. In dem Zusammenhang glaube ich nicht das Torpedoangriffe gegen Destroyer viel Wirkung gezeigt hätten, abgesehen von ihre notorische Unzuverlässigkeit waren die deutsche Torpedo's 1940 kaum schneller als ein Destroyer mit Volldampf.

[Matrose71]

In dem Zusammenhang glaube ich nicht das Torpedoangriffe gegen Destroyer viel Wirkung gezeigt hätten, abgesehen von ihre notorische Unzuverlässigkeit waren die deutsche Torpedo's 1940 kaum schneller als ein Destroyer mit Volldampf.

Also ich möchte wirklich nicht unfreundlich werden, aber ein bischen mehr Wissen wäre angebracht, wenn man solche Behauptungen aufstellt!

Wir reden hier über den G7 Torpedo, den gab es in Ausführung a, dampfgetrieben 44kn und Ausführung e elektrisch getrieben für die U-Boote 30kn.
Die Torpedokrise wurde offensichtlich bei Weserübung ein halbes- bis dreivierteljahr vor Seelöwe, zum Zeitpinkt von Seelöwe waren alle wieder mit Aufschlagzünder unterwegs und nicht mit Magnetzünder wie bei Weserübung!

Also eimal die These der deutsche Torpedo ist zu langsam stimmt nicht; 44kn, und der Aufschlagzünder hat funktioniert, also auch das Argument der Unzurverlässigkeit stimmt zum Zeitpunkt von Seelöwe durchaus nicht!

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7_%28Torpedo%29

[Doveton]

moin,

danke 

mit anderen Worten: allein nach Beginn des Auslaufens hatten die Briten schon mindestens 2 oder 3 Tage Vorwarnzeit ... na, prima ...

Gruß, Urs

In practice, I am afraid it would have turned out a little differently. All through August and the beginning of September German convoys and separate towing units had been observed moving westwards, filling up the French invasion ports. To differentiate these from the real thing would not have been that simple. This is shown by the "invasion scare" in the beginning of September.

More importantly, when the invasion warning was given very little RN resources were available to investigate, not to say, interrupt it. There was a destroyer patrol already available (3-4 destroyers, I believe) in the Channel at the time but nothing more could be put up before the next night when two patrols were launched - inclusive, I believe, a cruiser in each. This shows one of the fundamental weaknesses of the RN at the time, they were not allowed to operate in the Channel during daylight (much as around Crete) because of the fear of the Luftwaffe. If the invasion had taken place that night only a small part of it had been influenced by this RN patrol. Actually, the KM escort force was to be several times more powerful than this RN destroyer flotilla operating out of the western-most part of the planned landing area.

With other words, the first invasion "wave" had reached their targets more or less unscathed.

In the end of September even less RN resources were available as an increased transfer of destroyers to convoy escort service (due to the activities of the German U-boats) had started.

Regds

Fred

Forgive me for replying in English. I regret that my German is simply not up to the task, but I could not let such claims pass unchallenged.

With regard to the first paragraph, I would point out that Transport Force 'C' under Captain Kleikamp at Calais, would have been a formation 16.5 kilometres long when it finally managed to form up outside the port. Force 'D' (Captain Lindenau) consisted of 165 barge trains, each of one towing vessel and two barges. This force, when it eventually formed up outside Boulogne, would have required four hours of daylight plus the whole of the night in order to reach the intended landing beaches at dawn on D-Day. It is frankly beyond belief that British observers would have mistaken formations such as these for the regular transfer of small numbers of barges which had been taking place along the coast in September.

Second paragraph. The Royal Navy operated regular destroyer patrols every night throughout September, usually consisting of four destroyers. The implication in the paragraph that the RN had nothing else available is totally misleading. In mid September, 1940, there were 11 destroyers and two cruisers at Plymouth (eight hours at 20 knots from Calais), 1 cruiser, 16 destroyers, 5 French & Dutch torpedo boats, and 6 MTBs at Porstmouth/Southampton (3.5 hours at 20 knots from Calais), 6 destroyers and 11 MTBs at Harwich (3.5 hours from Calais), and 2 cruisers and 18 destroyers at Sheerness/Chatham. There were a further three cruisers, 5 destroyers, and 11 MTBs in the Humber. At the time of the supposed invasion scare, the regular nightly patrol, consisting of four destroyers of the First Destroyer Flotilla, were diverted to support MTBs engaging a small number of barges off Calais, but by the time they arrived the barges had entered harbour. Similarly, on the night of 8/9 September, two forces, each of a cruiser and three destroyers, investigated Calais & Boulogne respectively, finding no signs of German naval activity but shelling barges in the inner harbour. On the same night, four destroyers from DF1 patrolled the coast from Le Touquet to the mouth of the Seine, again encountering no activity, whilst MTBs investigated the ports of Dunkirk and Ostend. From the point of view of the RN, there was no invasion scare, and the suggestion that four destroyers was all the RN could send out is wholly misleading. Had the invasion forces been encountered, the resources I have described above would have been committed. I can, of course, provide the names of every British or Allied vessel involved. The idea that the first wave of invasion barges would have reached their beaches unscathed is, in all honesty, nonsense, and to suggest that the escorting vessels were several times more powerful that the forces the RN could have committed against them is laughable.

The final matters are easily dealt with. RN vessels were not forbidden to operate in the Channel in daylight. There was simply no reason for them to take such action. German naval units were not active in the Channel in daylight either, and simply cruising up and down the Channel in daylight would have served no useful purpose unless and until the invasion forces had been detected at sea.

The transfer of some of the RN anti-invasion forces to Atlantic escort duties actually began in early October, when it was clear both from deteriorating weather conditions in the Channel with the approach of winter, and from the gradual dispersal of the barge concentrations, that the immediate threat of invasion had receded. Certainly, the successes of a comparatively small number of U-Boats in the Atlantic was a source of great concern to Churchill and the Admiralty, but the primary duty of the RN forces in Home Waters in the second half of 1940 was the prevention of invasion, and the seventy or so cruisers and destroyers allocated to this task stayed where they were until the threat had been averted.

Incidentally, all this information is readily available in the British Admiralty archives, to which I have been fortunate enough to have had access. It is, perhaps, a cause for regret that Mr. Leander presumably did not have access to such sources. If he had, one hopes he would not have made such wildly erroneous claims and reached such improbable conclusions!     

[Leandros]

Hi, guys – the number crunching you are into here now has, in my opinion, little relevance – especially regarding the British forces. If these should be of any use they would all have "to be there". They weren't.

The reasons for this being: A large part of the British army resources were placed North of London, on the East Coast. In September '40 the British leadership still feared German landings there and the German diversionary actions before an eventual invasion were meant to keep this in focus. The British forces in the area South of London were organized in a coastal "crunch" and an allegedly mobile reserve. If this mobile reserve, which was meant to be the real defense of Southern England should be effective, the main part of the effective weapons would have to stay with this. Not in the "crunch" where they would be over-run, surrounded and captured.  With other words, very little punch positioned at the coast.

The Royal Navy of September 1940 has been very over-rated, particularly the destroyer force. There were no destroyers based between Portsmouth and the Thames Estuary. They had literally been chased away by the Luftwaffe. Of those officially based in the Portsmouth and Nore Command in the end of September, many were actually in repairs or on escort duty in the North-Western Approaches as this area was also under Portsmouth Command.  The larger, more modern destroyers, most of them assigned to the Home Fleet, could not be detached from this as the Home Fleet would then be incapacitated. And the Home Fleet was not going South.  Incidentally, 18 months later almost all these large destroyers had been sunk, most by the German and Italian air and naval forces, and mines,  in the Mediterranean. During the one real invasion scare very little RN resources were available to interfere. Even the night after, only a couple of small flotillas were available, each with a cruiser, one of which hit a mine.  Quick reaction was not an RN custom at the time. This was also shown very clearly during the Channel Dash, an operation that was expected, and planned for in detail, by the British.

The RN auxiliaries...? These were not positioned, armed or trained to operate as proper combat units. They all had their daily chores to attend to, patrolling the coast singly or in pairs, as port guard ships or in routine minesweeping. A number I have seen mentioned is 700 of these auxiliaries. Never mind if this is correct or not, they were spread all around the British coast. They were not there.
The minesweepers could not leave their regular sweeping areas simply because an important part of the German build-up towards Sea Lion was mining.

The Royal Air Force at the time had shown that they could not keep the Channel clear. The first part of the Battle of Britain, the Kanalkampf (which is probably the best comparison to a Sea Lion), showed they could not protect their merchant and naval friends. On the other hand several RN destroyers were sunk by the Luftwaffe in short order, till the traffic could be reopened on a nightly basis. The second part, the decimation of the Fighter Command, could also not be hindered other than when Gøring intervened and saved it by switching his priorities to London on Sept. 7th. During the Dunkirk evacuation more than 200 Allied vessels were destroyed (some by German MTB's and submarines) in spite of the fact that the Fighter Command flew almost exactly as many fighter missions in the area as the Luftwaffe. This must be seen in the light of the short operational period, approx. 2 ½ days with permissible weather, the long flying distances for most of the German units (they were still based in Germany) and that most of the Luftwaffe was engaged elsewhere and had had losses through three weeks of fighting. During a Sea Lion the whole Luftwaffe, with refurbished Stuka units, would be concentrated on the invasion and they would operate from dozens of well-prepared airfields close to the Channel, some former French and some newly established, but all with good time for preparations.

In September 1940 it was the Germans that were the professionals, not the British. And the British knew it. There were disagreements in the British leadership whether the RN should sacrifice itself in a defense of Southern England. As opposed to the number-crunching of British units and materiel the actual German forces would be there – when it happened. The time aspect would be very important. If the British forces could not decidedly hamper the German development within the first 3 days they would have serious problems.  German coastal artillery would be ashore, the first German stop line would have been reached and much of the transport fleet would be back in France.

Have you considered this: The RN could not operate during daytime. There is no reason why the large German transports could not return to France in the evening to avoid eventual RN intrusions to return in the morning. The radar of the German coastal artillery in the Straits had coverage almost up to the Thames Estuary. As such their friends could be warned, either to withdraw or concentrate for defensive operations.  Each and every German army unit to land on S-day was not "normal" army units. All had been reinforced with specialist personnel and equipment. The units participating had almost all gone through the Polish and Western campaigns. To understand this one has to read the actual orders. Halder's diaries are also very useful.

I could write much more (I have in my book......) but would like to end with a question: If the invasion of Poland, Weserübung, the Western Campaign, Barbarossa, the taking of Crete and Singapore, had not taken place, would you have believed it could happen? In none of these actions, except maybe Poland, can it be said that the Germans (or Japanese) had overwhelming forces - on the contrary.

Most of us have grown up in the WW2 victors' glorifying, almost brainwashing, of that side's ventures. It can be very difficult, for some it seems almost nauseating, to see it from a different perspective. In my book I have. If you want to share my perspectives you now have the opportunity (perhaps) to do it cheaply as I every 10th day put up a no-reserve auction at the US eBay. Here is the link – only a few hours left for this time:

http://www.ebay.com/itm/270901483241?ssPageName=STRK:MESELX:IT&_trksid=p3984.m1555.l2649

Regds

Fred

[Urs Heßling]

hi, Fred,

Incidentally, 18 months later almost all these large destroyers had been sunk, most by the German and Italian air and naval forces, and mines,  in the Mediterranean.

Almost all  ... well, I don´t know  ... and if you mention this as a "side line" it would be only fair to point out that many of them were lost in situations without fighter cover (e.g., off Crete)

greetings, Urs

[Huszar]

Hallo,

Wenn ich das noch mal überprüfe stimmt das mit zwei Nächte auf See für den Geleitzug aus Rotterdam in der Tat nicht genau, es waren 48 Stunden veranschlagt für das Auslaufen und die Flotte sollte sich etwa 18 Stunden vor S-Zeit komplett vor Hoek van Holland (Versammlungsraum I) gesammelt haben in und Marsch setzen. Ankunft vor Ort etwa 2 Stunden nach S-Zeit, die Schiffsbewegungen hätten also ingesamt 68 Stunden gedauert, ich bleibe mal dabei dass die RN Vorwarnung und Zeit genug gehabt hätte um den Geleitzug mit starken Kräften abzufangen.

Das ist schlicht und einfach Blödsinn. 48 Stunden für das Auslaufen der Transportflotte und 18 Stunden auf See bedeuten immernoch nicht, dass die Frachter 2 Nächte unterwegs sein sollten. Dann nochmals nachlegen: die ganze Bewegung hätte 68 Stunden gedauert. Bedeutet immernoch nicht, die Flotte wäre 3 Tage unterwegs gewesen.
Jetzt angenommen, die 35sm bis in den Versammlungsraum dauern wirklich 48 Stunden, wo stehen dann die Frachter? Nein, nicht auf offener See, sondern in der Scheldemündung, bei Vlissingen.
Erst wenn die Engländer wissen, wohin diese Flotte fährt, können die Zerstörer angesetzt werden (nicht egal, ob sie nach Suffolk oder Kent fahren!). Am Nachmittag Tag S-1!  Angenommen und vorausgesetzt, die RAF kann am Nachmittag des S-1 Tages die Flotte aufklären, und die Meldung zeitgerecht übermitteln.

Eine solche hunderprozentige Gewissheit, wie einzelne bez. Entdeckung, Aufklärung und Vernichtung der Geleitzüge haben, ist völlig abwegig, übertrieben und ungerechtfertigt.

abgesehen von ihre notorische Unzuverlässigkeit waren die deutsche Torpedo's 1940 kaum schneller als ein Destroyer mit Volldampf.

No Comment. Auf dieses Niveau möchte ich mich nicht begeben.

mfg

alex

PS:

it would be only fair to point out that many of them were lost in situations without fighter cover (e.g., off Crete)

Ob die RN im Kanal genügend Jägerdeckung bekommen könnte/würde...

[Leandros]

Incidentally, 18 months later almost all these large destroyers had been sunk, most by the German and Italian air and naval forces, and mines,  in the Mediterranean.

By Urs: Almost all  ... well, I don´t know  ... and if you mention this as a "side line" it would be only fair to point out that many of them were lost in situations without fighter cover (e.g., off Crete)

greetings, Urs

It does sound incredible but I believe only one of them survived 1942. As for fighter escort in the Channel September 1940 I am afraid the RN wouldn't get much help. They could not influence on the outcome of the Kanalkampf and they didn't help much during the Dunkirk evacuation even if the Fighter Command flew as many sorties as the Luftwaffe fighter units. If the RN hadn't stopped destroyer operations during daytime it would have been even worse. The RAF would have to fly CAP's to protect their naval units while the Luftwaffe could attack at will. The other way around...?..: Well, the Brits had much fewer, and less effective, anti-ship assets.

Fred

[mhorgran]

Irgendwie habe ich auch das Gefühl, das irgendwie ausgeblendet wird, dass es auch eine KM gab, mit Schnellbooten, Torpedobooten, Zerstören. leichten und schweren Kreuzern und Schlachtschiffen und jede Menge Kleinzeug, Minensucher, Hilfsschiffe (z.B Bremse etc...) und U-Booten.
Was davon jetzt im Einzelnen einsatzbereit ist, muss man prüfen, aber ich nehme nicht an, dass die bei dieser Operation im Hafen bleiben und sie hätten die volle Unterstützung der LW.
Und das ist ein weiterer riesen Unterschied zu Kreta, da gab es runde 5 Zerstörer und Torpedoboote (Italiener) insgesamt.

Schenk meint das die KM sicherlich auch andere Möglichkeiten ausgeschöpft hätte. Es gab ja eine ganze Reihe von (Beute und eigene) Schiffe  in Zerstörergröße die -als Provisorium - hätten genutzt werden können.

"Torpedo vs Zerstörer"
Ob ein Torpedo schneller oder langsamer als ein DD war ist wohl eher, nmV, nebensächlich. Die Torpedos sollten den DD ja auch nicht einholen sondern von der Seite treffen. Oder Urs?

[Doveton]

It seems a pity that Mr. Leander appears more intent upon trying to persuade people to buy his book than in justifying his extreme statements with proper evidence. Therefore, I shall attempt to correct one or two of his comments with accurate facts. I am willing to provide the evidence to support these facts if requested, but as I said earlier my German is wholly inadequate, and I could therefore only properly respond to questions asked in English. I apologise once again for my ignorance!
Firstly, the dispositions of the RN destroyers allocated to anti-invasion duties was exactly as I stated earlier. I have specifically excluded vessels in the area undergoing repair or refit, and nor have I included the 10 destroyers and one (Dutch) torpedo boat actually with convoys. All of these, incidentally, could have been recalled, and arrived back in the Channel, within 24 hours had it been necessary. The only base evacuated by the RN in September 1940 was Dover, for the entirely sensible reason that it was simply too close to France, and the other major bases were within 4 to 5 hours sailing in any case.
The fact  that many of the larger destroyers were subsequently lost has no relevance to the Sealion operation. As the most modern and best ships of their type in the RN they were employed at the 'sharp end' of the war. Perhaps this may be an unfamiliar fact to Mr. Leander, but ships are sunk, tanks are destroyed, and men are killed, in war.
I have already dealt with the reaction to the invasion scare. The fact that only two 'small flotillas' were sent out clearly does not mean that they were all that was available. Had evidence of major German naval activity been detected, the rest of the anti-invasion would have been summoned.
The auxiliaries were indeed positioned to support the initial destroyer intervention. I agree that they were not capable of engaging fleet destroyers, but they were more than capable of despatching armed trawlers and tugs towing barges full of seasick soldiers. As the Kreigsmarine were intending to protect the barge trains with similar vessels, perhaps Mr. Leander could explain why the British vessels were so much less incapable of combat than the German ones.
The RAF never attempted to keep the Channel clear. Kanalkampf was an attempt to draw out British fighter resources over the Channel, and Dowding wisely ordered his squadrons not to venture out beyond the coast, thus ensuring that losses to aircrew were minimised.
The reference to the Dunkirk losses is intentionally misleading. Actual British losses totalled 235 vessels, which sounds dramatic until the vessel types are examined. Of the 235, 154 were the famous 'Little Ships', and a further 35 small vessels such as tugs, landing craft, and Dutch barges.
Of the remaining  46, 1 was an Armed Boarding Vessel, 29 trawlers and drifters, 6 minesweepers, 1 gunboat, 6 destroyers,  and 3 torpedo boats.   I am sure I do not need to point out that, with over 170 destroyers in commission, the loss of six in exchange for the successful evacuation of over 330,000 men was more than acceptable to the British Government.
Frankly, it is immature to suggest that in September 1940 the British were amateurs and the Germans professionals. The officers and men of the regular navies of both sides were equally professional, but the fact is that the British had a lot more of them, and had in addition access to the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. Germany, as a major land power, had no such reserve of trained manpower.
There was no disagreement in the British leadership with regard to the role of the Royal Navy in the prevention of invasion. The C-in-C Home Fleet, Sir Charles Forbes, believed that the British held too many warships back in the Channel ports, arguing that more should have been allocated to convoy escort duty and recalled when/if an invasion was attempted, but he was overruled by the First Sea Lord (Sir Dudley Pound), and by Churchill. Personally, I believe that Forbes was right, but it is easy to be wise after the event and, of course, the British did not realize how desperately weak the German navy of September 1940 really was. In either case, however, once the RN did arrive then German re-supply lines would have been hopelessly disrupted.
Finally, I observe that Mr. Leander still clings to the belief that 'The RN could not operate during daytime'. The fact is, no situation arose during the latter half of 1940 which required the RN to operate in the Channel in daytime.  Had the circumstances been different, by which I mean that a German invasion force had been detected entering the Channel in daylight, then I am sure, from my reading of British Admiralty records of the time, that the RN would have been there in strength, whatever the light conditions.
The fact is that the RN in 1940 was overwhelmingly superior in the Channel , and the German High Command wisely realized that an invasion attempt would have been a disaster. This comment is not, as Mr. Leander unjustly claims 'glorifying, almost brainwashing, of that side's ventures'. It is simply a reasoned assessment based on the evidence available to the impartial student.

[Bergedorf]

Irgendwie habe ich auch das Gefühl, das irgendwie ausgeblendet wird, dass es auch eine KM gab, mit Schnellbooten, Torpedobooten, Zerstören. leichten und schweren Kreuzern und Schlachtschiffen und jede Menge Kleinzeug, Minensucher, Hilfsschiffe (z.B Bremse etc...) und U-Booten.
Was davon jetzt im Einzelnen einsatzbereit ist, muss man prüfen, aber ich nehme nicht an, dass die bei dieser Operation im Hafen bleiben und sie hätten die volle Unterstützung der LW.
Und das ist ein weiterer riesen Unterschied zu Kreta, da gab es runde 5 Zerstörer und Torpedoboote (Italiener) insgesamt.

Schenk meint das die KM sicherlich auch andere Möglichkeiten ausgeschöpft hätte. Es gab ja eine ganze Reihe von (Beute und eigene) Schiffe  in Zerstörergröße die -als Provisorium - hätten genutzt werden können.

"Torpedo vs Zerstörer"
Ob ein Torpedo schneller oder langsamer als ein DD war ist wohl eher, nmV, nebensächlich. Die Torpedos sollten den DD ja auch nicht einholen sondern von der Seite treffen. Oder Urs?

Die Kriegsmarine hatte aber kein Personal mehr übrig um ggf. weitere Möglichkeiten auszuschöpfen. Als Prahmbesatzungen wurden z.b. schon Sportsegler verpflichtet u.ä. Die in den Werften befindlichen Schiffe und die Schulen sind personell geplündert und die Uboots-Ausbildung gefährdet. Da hätte man nicht mal so eben ein paar weitere Schiffe bemannen können (ganz abgesehen davon, das man die auch hätte einfahren müssen).

Zu Leandros kann ich nur den Kopf schütteln... zumindest hat sich die Royal Navy für stark genug gehalten um einer Invasion zu begegnen. Forbes wollte die dicken Schiffe unter anderem deshalb aus dem Kanal fernhalten, weil er davon ausging, dass die kleinen Einheiten locker reichen.

Was an Kleinkram neben den Zerstörern und Kreuzern da unten war hatte ich ja schon weiter oben aufgeführt. Es stimmt zwar das die Minensucher natürlich auch andere Aufgaben hatten, aber die APV-Vessels und die AS-Trawler hätten keine andere Aufgabe gehabt als die Invasion abzuwehren.

Gruß

Dirk

[Doveton]

Irgendwie habe ich auch das Gefühl, das irgendwie ausgeblendet wird, dass es auch eine KM gab, mit Schnellbooten, Torpedobooten, Zerstören. leichten und schweren Kreuzern und Schlachtschiffen und jede Menge Kleinzeug, Minensucher, Hilfsschiffe (z.B Bremse etc...) und U-Booten.
Was davon jetzt im Einzelnen einsatzbereit ist, muss man prüfen, aber ich nehme nicht an, dass die bei dieser Operation im Hafen bleiben und sie hätten die volle Unterstützung der LW.
Und das ist ein weiterer riesen Unterschied zu Kreta, da gab es runde 5 Zerstörer und Torpedoboote (Italiener) insgesamt.

Schenk meint das die KM sicherlich auch andere Möglichkeiten ausgeschöpft hätte. Es gab ja eine ganze Reihe von (Beute und eigene) Schiffe  in Zerstörergröße die -als Provisorium - hätten genutzt werden können.

"Torpedo vs Zerstörer"
Ob ein Torpedo schneller oder langsamer als ein DD war ist wohl eher, nmV, nebensächlich. Die Torpedos sollten den DD ja auch nicht einholen sondern von der Seite treffen. Oder Urs?

Die Kriegsmarine hatte aber kein Personal mehr übrig um ggf. weitere Möglichkeiten auszuschöpfen. Als Prahmbesatzungen wurden z.b. schon Sportsegler verpflichtet u.ä. Die in den Werften befindlichen Schiffe und die Schulen sind personell geplündert und die Uboots-Ausbildung gefährdet. Da hätte man nicht mal so eben ein paar weitere Schiffe bemannen können (ganz abgesehen davon, das man die auch hätte einfahren müssen).

Zu Leandros kann ich nur den Kopf schütteln... zumindest hat sich die Royal Navy für stark genug gehalten um einer Invasion zu begegnen. Forbes wollte die dicken Schiffe unter anderem deshalb aus dem Kanal fernhalten, weil er davon ausging, dass die kleinen Einheiten locker reichen.

Was an Kleinkram neben den Zerstörern und Kreuzern da unten war hatte ich ja schon weiter oben aufgeführt. Es stimmt zwar das die Minensucher natürlich auch andere Aufgaben hatten, aber die APV-Vessels und die AS-Trawler hätten keine andere Aufgabe gehabt als die Invasion abzuwehren.

Gruß

Dirk

You are quite correct about Forbes. The Home Fleet remained at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, in case Kriegsmarine heavy ships attempted to sortie into the Atlantic. Forbes would only have brought his big ships south if German heavy warships entered the southern part of the North Sea in support of an invasion. We now know that the 8 inch gun cruiser Admiral Hipper was the only German heavy ship available at the time, and even she had defective engines, but obviously the British Admiralty were not aware of this at the time. 

The fact is that it is actually quite difficult to hit a barge or trawler at short range with a 15 inch or 16 inch shell, whereas a destroyer with 4 inch or 4.7 inch guns is ideal for the task. British A-I class destroyers, by the way, mounted four guns with 170 rounds for each.

[Urs Heßling]

hi, Fred,

It does sound incredible but I believe only one of them survived 1942.

well, I believe you are wrong, IMO these are the facts (I hope Doveton agrees  )
- Tribals : 2 were lost before September 1940, 3 in 1941, 7 in 1942 (4 in the Med) and 4 survived the war
- "J" : 5 were lost in 1941/1942, and 2 survived the war
- "K" : 1 was lost before September 1940, 5 were lost in 1941/1942 (all in the Med), and 2 survived the war

greetings, Urs

[AndreasB]

The fact is that the RN in 1940 was overwhelmingly superior in the Channel , and the German High Command wisely realized that an invasion attempt would have been a disaster. This comment is not, as Mr. Leander unjustly claims 'glorifying, almost brainwashing, of that side's ventures'. It is simply a reasoned assessment based on the evidence available to the impartial student.

Well said.

All the best

Andreas