Seelöwe

[Huszar]

So, ich hab endgültig die Schauze voll

[Knouterer]

Mal was über Küstenartillerie: Dezember 1914 bombardierten drei deutsche Kriegsschiffe Hartlepool, verteidigt von 3x6" Geschütze (das gleiche Modell, Mk VII, dass 22 Jahre später immer noch allgemein in Gebrauch war bei den Emergency Coast Batteries, denke ich)  Aus dem Coast Artillery Journal von 1933:
"THE BOMBARDMENT
The morning of December 16th dawned with a heavy sea mist, and at about 4,000 yards to the east a fog bank completely obscured the view. Visibility southwards was a little better, being good up to about 6,000 yards. The sky was overcast. There was a slight breeze from the northeast, and, except for a slight rolling swell, the sea was calm. At about 8:00 A.M. the Fire Commander received a message from South Gare Battery: "Dreadnoughts steaming north."
This was followed almost immediately by a message from the Signal Station:
"Three warships coming in at great speed."
As the approach of the ships was obscured from the Fire Commander by the lighthouse, he inquired:
"What nationality?"
"They are our ships; they are flying the White Ensign, and have answered our signals," came the reply from the
Signal Station.
In reply to a further query, it was stated that the ships appeared to be of the "Indomitable" class.
The guns of both batteries had meanwhile been manned.
Almost immediately after this conversation the ships were heard to be firing seaward.
"What are they firing at?" enquired the Fire Commander.
"I presume at the enemy," replied the Signal Station.
"Are you sure they are not firing at our own destroyers?"
"I can't see what they are firing at," came the reply.
At that moment the leading ship loomed into view out ofthe mist, and by its color and silhouette the Fire Commander
was definitely able to identify it as being German. Any lingering doubts were swiftly dispelled when the
leading ship, later identified as the battle-cruiser Seydlitz, opened fire with her 11" guns on Heugh Battery.
The time was then 8:10 A.M. The first round fell beside the low wall which formed the boundary between Heugh
Battery and the broad pathway leading to the promenade.
This round which was dead range and only about 25 yards to the left of the guns as viewed from the seaward
side, killed a sentry and three men of the infantry guard, as well as completely wrecking all telephonic communication
within the batteries.
A second round fell within a few feet of the first, killing two men of the Durham Royal Garrison Artillery who had rushed
to the assistance of the infantrymen. Another round struck the end house of one of the terraces immediately
in rear of Lighthouse Battery, two of the occupants, both women, being killed.
The Seydlitz, as she steamed slowly north, was immediately engaged by both guns of Heugh Battery at a
range of 4,I5O yards and a bearing of 34 degrees. Fire was opened with high explosive ammunition. The
method of ranging was by bracketing on the observation of single rounds. Lighthouse Battery, in accordance with
the distribution of fire scheme, immediately engaged the rear ship of the three, since known to have been the
battle-cruiser Blucher. The action had now become general, all three ships pouring broadsides of 11/1,8/1 and 4"
projectiles on the batteries, the Seydlitz and the centre ship, since known to have been the battle-cruiser Moltke,
engaging Heugh Battery while the Blucher engaged Lighthouse Battery.
The range to the target was quickly found, and as the shell power of a 6" shell was obviously insufficient to penetrate the sides of the heavily armoured ships, the M.P.J. was raised to the upper-structures and the more vital parts where considerable damage was seen to result.
Although the narrow strip of land in front of the battery and the ground round about was being plowed up
by the enemy projectiles, the detachments served their guns and overcame the confusion of action with commendable
calm and precision.
The worst thing of all was seeing each ship momentarily lit up by a nasty yellow glare and having to wait
for the result. It was only a matter of a few seconds at that range. Each salvo as it arrived was preceded by an
appalling "onde-de-choc," that curious double report which occurs when you are stationed in line with a high
velocity gun at short or medium range. The shells were so low that the wind of each salvo knocked down any
men that happened to be on the parapet, and caps were snatched off heads and whirled away like leaves.
The two leading ships, about 1,000 yards apart, were meanwhile steaming slowly northwards, the Seydlitz still
followed by the guns of Heugh Battery. At a bearing of about 3 degrees, No. 2 gun came within the blast angle of No. 1. The time was now about 8:25 A.M. As the range was long and observation was difficult, both guns were ordered to change target to the Moltke. which up to that time had not been engaged, and fire on her was continued until she too came within the blast angle of No.2 gun. Until this time, the B.c. of Heugh Battery had given no thought to the third ship, the Blucher.
He now saw that she was practically stationary and that she was not being engaged by Lighthouse Battery. Both
guns of Heugh Battery were immediately trained on to her, fire being opened with armour-piercing ammunition.
This appeared to have little effect, and after firing 19 rounds a change was made to high explosive ammunition.
Immediately fire was lifted on to her upperstructures the Blucher steamed eastwards at high speed, still engaging the battery with her aft guns."
(to be continued)

[Knouterer]

"The other two ships had meanwhile been bombarding both the Hartlepools, the chief objectives apparently being
the steel works, docks, ship-yards, gasworks, and the railway freight and passenger stations. After some fifteen
minutes steady bombardment of these objectives both ships turned about and steamed in a southeasterly direction
obliquely across the front of the batteries, again opening fire on them with their starboard broadsides. As
the Moltke reentered the field of fire of No. I gun she was again engaged by both guns of Heugh Battery until
she disappeared into the mist to join the Blucher. A change of target was then made to the Seydlitz as she
followed in the wake of the Moltke and fire on her was continued until she too disappeared into the mist, the
last round from the battery being fired at 8:52 A.M. at a range of 9,200 yards without reply from the ships.
In engaging the Blucher, the single gun of Lighthouse Battery opened with high explosive ammunition, at a range of about 6,000 yards and a bearing of 52 degrees.
The method of ranging was by observation and correction of single rounds. During the observation and correction
of the first two rounds, which fell short, the range closed to about 4,500 yards. The third round, a direct hit,
carried away a good part of the fore-bridge and disabled two 6" guns, as well as exploding their deck supply of
ammunition and killing nine seamen and wounding three. It was extremely unfortUnate that the next round
was a misfire, owing to a break in the electrical circuit, and a change was immediately made to percussion firing.
Some delay was caused by the misfire, and when fire was continued further corrections were necessary before more
hits were observed. Further misfires occurred while at the percussion method "owing to the split pin below the
adjustable bushing having jarred loose or broken." The break in the electrical circuit was subsequently found to
have been caused by the "A" lead becoming detached from the gun and cradle contact. This was remedied,
and the last three rounds were fired electrically.
The Blucher had meanwhile taken up a stationary position in line with the lighthouse and the gun of lighthouse
Battery, thus rendering herself immune from that gun, and she was not engaged again until the guns of
Heugh Battery were brought to bear upon her toward the end of the action. For the greater part of the action
she was therefore able to pour uninterrupted fire on the batteries. While the other two ships were engaging
Heugh Battery, the Blucher was firing black powderfilled shells on the rocks in front of the battery. This
attempt at producing a smoke screen, which, during the war was probably the earliest of the experiments in
that direction, was fairly effective and greatly interfered with the laying of the guns and the observation of fire.
South Gare Battery was not engaged in the action, as by the time the identity of the ships was established they
were out of range.
Throughout the action, in the absence of telephonic communication, orders and corrections to the guns were
passed by megaphone, and this was apparently effective in spite of the noise of our guns and the arrival of enemy
projectiles. Even had the telephone lines not been shattered by the first round from the ships, it is extremely
doubtful whether the telephones would have been of any use. During the latter part of the action the Heugh
Battery Commander fought the guns from a position midway between each gun, the Fire Commander passing
observations and corrections by megaphone from the B.C. post.
NAVAL CRAFT ENGAGED
After the action it became known that the four destroyers when northward of the batteries observed the
approach of the enemy ships and were immediately engaged by them. As they were apparently unable to get
within effective torpedo range of the battle-cruisers and were therefore quite helpless against such heavily armed
and armoured ships, the destroyers spread, all except the Waveney having suffered damage.
The Patrol and Forward. with tlre submarine, left their berths in the Victoria Dock immediately the presence
of the enemy ships became known. Patrol was struck by an 11" shell, apparently an "over" intended for the batteries,
when she was heading for the harbor exit, and later went aground after being engaged by one of the enemy ships. By the time Forward and the submarine reached the harbor exit the action was over and the enemy vessels had disappeared into the mist.
CASUALTIES
The casualties to naval and military personnel were:
Naval               Killed             Wounded
H.M.S. Patrol        4                  7
H.M.S.Doon          3                  6
Total                   7                13
Military
Durham R.G.A.       2
Royal Engineers                        6
18th DLI               5                 7
Total                   7                13
All casualties to military personnel were caused outside the batteries. That there were none inside was largely due to the foresight of Colonel Robson, who was responsible for the erection of a camouflage extension along the of the wall in rear of the batteries a year or so before the war. This extension, as well as forming a background against which it was difficult to locate the guns from seaward, gave a false impression of the height of the batteries, which probably accounts for the large proportion of "overs" from the ships."

[Knouterer]

(Bisschen viel Text, zugegeben, und slightly off topic, aber man findet nicht oft solche fachmännische und detaillierte Berichte ...)
"ENEMY CASUALTIES
According to a report copied from the German press, the casualties to personnel among the three ships amounted to 80 killed and about 200 wounded. All three ships were damaged, the Blucher more seriously than the other two. In his book The German High Sea Fleet in the Great War, the late Admiral van Scheer, after mentioning that five battle-cruisers (the Seydlitz, Moltke, Blucher, Von Der Tann and Derfflinger), left their base on December 15th for a rendezvous due east of Whitby with the object of bombarding that town, Scarborough and Harrlepool, writes:
The big cruisersthen divided into two groups for the bombardment of the coastal towns, the northern section, the
"Seydlitz," "Moltke" and "Blucher," making for Hartlepool.
An officerof one of the U-boats who had reconnoitered the area beforehand rendered good servicein locating the place.
Shortly before they were off Hartlepool the cruisers were attacked by four torpedo-boat destroyers of the "River"
class that ran out to sea and were brought under fire at a range of about 5 km. The sinking of one destroyer and
heavy damage to another were observed. After firing some torpedoes without result, they turned away. We gave up
pursuing them so as not to lose time for the bombardment.
The "Seydlitz" opened fire on the Cemetery Battery and scored several hits so that at last the fire was only returned
by one 15 cm. gun and one light gun from the battery.
The "Moltke" was hit above the water-line, causing much damage between decks but no loss of life. From the first,
the "Blucher" came under a lively fire from the land batteries; she had nine killed and three wounded by one hit
alone. Fifteen cm. howitzers and light artillery were used on land; the "Blucher" was hit six times altogether.
This account is inaccurate in some respects, as although all except Waveney received damage, none of the
destroyers were sunk, and all were able to make port.
The Cemetery Battery referred to, about 231z miles north of Heugh Battery, had been derelict for many years before
the war, and no shells fell in its vicinity during the bombardment. There were no howitzers and light artillery
used on land-only the three 6" guns.
THE BOMBARDING VESSELS
The Seydlitz and Moltke were two of the most powerful ships of the German High Sea Fleet. Of immensely
strong construction they were in many respects similar, the Seydlitz being slightly bigger. Of 25,000 tons displacement,
her measurements were: Length, 656 feet;beam, 93 feet; freeboard (maximum), 33 feet. With acomplement of a little over 1,100 both ships carried the following armament:
11" guns            10
  6" guns            12
24-pounders       12
Their maximum speed was about 26 knots.
The Blucher was an older and smaller ship of 15,500 tons displacement. With a complement of 847, her
armament was:
  8" guns            12
  6" guns             8
24-pounders       16
According to the German official historian of the war, during the 42 minutes bombardment the three ships fired
1,150 projectiles.
A COMPARISON OF SHELL EXPENDITURE
Compared with the deluge of fire from the ships, the number of rounds fired by both the shore batteries during
the action totalled only 123, Of these, 108 were fired by Heugh Battery (47 from No. I gun and 61 from No.
2), and the remaining 15 from the single gun of Lighthouse Battery. It is estimated that the 123 rounds were
distributed as follows:
Seydlitz - - 70
Moltke        20
Blucher       33
The slow rate of fire-an average of one round per gun per minute for the three guns-was due chiefly to three causes: (I) the smoke and dust caused by the striking of the enemy projectiles, which, as already mentioned, greatly interfered with the laying of the guns and the observation of fire, (2) the single gun of Lighthouse Battery being masked by the lighthouse for the greater part of the action, and (3) the great number of misfires which occurred, most of them on the gun of Lighthouse Battery. Although a misfire can seldom be justified, the four which occurred between the two guns of Heugh Battery during the firing of 108 rounds, reflects, in the very difficult circumstances, a very high standard both in
preparation for action and in fire discipline. There is no record as to whether both guns or only one sustained misfires,
but the number of rounds fired by each gun (47 by No. I and 61 by No.2) points to No. I as being the unlucky gun. During the 42 minutes of the action, the time for each round fired by No. I gun gives an average of 54.7
seconds, and for No.2 gun 40.3 seconds. Considering the delay caused by interference with the laying of the
guns and range-finders due to the smoke and dust raised by the striking of enemy projectiles, and, through the
same cause, the difficulty in observation and correction of fire, combined with the fact that there were four
changes of target and that there was probably delay in passing orders and corrections through the tremendous
din caused by the firing of our guns and the striking of enemy projectiles, the figures compare very favorably
with the 8 seconds standard time allowed when engaging a target under peace conditions.
The calm state of the sea made perfect shooting conditions for us, as did the complete lack of wind. It was
no virtue that we "hit and hit" at that absurd range, but the shell-power against heavy armour was hopeless.
The damage we did was most surprising.
Lighthouse Battery, despite the good effect obtained against the Blucher at the beginning of the action, when
a direct hit, which caused great damage, was registered by the third round, thereafter fared badly, no less than
14 misfires occurring after this good work. One of these misfires, as already explained, was due to one of the
electric leads becoming detached. On changing to percussion there was no better result, 13 misfires occurring
dunng the attempts to fire the gun by this method.
All these misfires were due to the striker becoming decentralized. The break in the electric circuit was subsequently discovered and remedied. But much valuable time had been wasted, with the result that, pardy due to the delay caused by the misfires and partly to the Blucher placing herself in the dead area formed by the lighthouse, only 15 rounds were fired by Lighthouse Battery throughout the action. It is probably needless to mention that the offending lighthouse was demolished very soon after the action, its place being taken by a temporary wooden structure erected at a more appropriate spot away from the batteries.

[mhorgran]

@Stefan: Ja, da sind wir wieder beim Thema: Wenn Dtl. 1940 die Atombombe gehabt hätte, dann hätte man sich die ganze Planung sparen können.. hatten sie aber nicht!

stimmt, die Voraussetzungen konnten nicht erbracht werden deshalb lief die Operation nicht an, nur stellt sich die Frage - warum du wild in der Gegend rumrecherchierst und was die ganze Diskussion hier und das "Kriegsspiel" im PzArchivforum sollte.

aber egal

[Bergedorf]

@Stefan: Ja, da sind wir wieder beim Thema: Wenn Dtl. 1940 die Atombombe gehabt hätte, dann hätte man sich die ganze Planung sparen können.. hatten sie aber nicht!

stimmt, die Voraussetzungen konnten nicht erbracht werden deshalb lief die Operation nicht an, nur stellt sich die Frage - warum du wild in der Gegend rumrecherchierst und was die ganze Diskussion hier und das "Kriegsspiel" im PzArchivforum sollte.

aber egal

Und die Frage stellt sich, weshalb Du Dich dann an diesen Diskussionen beteiligst 

Nachtrag: Hier ein interessanter Artikel für alle die immer noch meinen dass das Fighter Command fast di BoB verloren hätte: logistics and the Battle of Britain: http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/49A0B127_1143_EC82_2E5196EA05B5185E.pdf   

[mhorgran]

Seltsame Frage.
Mir scheint ich kann die Voraussetzungen von Alternativszenarien benennen UND akzeptieren.

aber egal
wie schon Alex meinte:
Schnauze voll

[Knouterer]

Noch mal über Küstenartillerie, in der Hoffnung das ich noch nicht alle damit zu Tode gelangweilt habe:

Aus der Hartlepool-Affäre lernen wir dass 1914 drei Schlachtkreuzer (mit 20 x 28 cm, 12 x 20,3 cm, 32 x 15,2 cm) nicht imstande waren, in einem längeren Feuergefecht, 3 x 6" Küstengeschütze zum Schweigen zu bringen, und selbst einiges einstecken mussten.

Daher wage ich zu bezweifeln dass Anno 1940 7,5 cm Feldkanonen auf Prähmen, 8,8 cm SK auf Fischkutter, usw besser abgeschnitten hätten gegen ein Dutzend solcher Geschütze im Landeabschnitt B. Von "niederhalten" kann da schon mal gar nicht die Rede sein.

Es ist auch interessant das die Batterien das Feuer effektiv erwidern könnten, obwohl sie gleich am Anfang von der zentralen Feuerleitung abgeschnitten wurden.

Im Seelöwe-Szenario würden die Küstengeschütze über längere Zeit auf relative kurze Entfernung stationäre Zeile bekämpfen (die Prähme sobald sie auf Grund gelaufen waren, und die in Linie vor Anker liegende Transporter).

Noch mal das (Amerikanische) Coast Artillery Journal (Mai-Juni 1936):

"The outstanding lesson to be learned from this minor action is the fact that two small batteries, mounting minor calibre armament, suffered very slight damage and were able to continue firing after being treated to a veritable rain of shells from high-powered naval guns at almost point-blank range, a further proof (if any be needed) of the efficacy of seacoast batteries."     

   

[Bergedorf]

Vielen Dank Gerard,

finde ich höchst interessant!

Gruß

Dirk

[Knouterer]

Danke Dirk,

Die wirkung von Feldartillerie im Strandbereich sollte auch nicht unterschatzt werden, denke ich. Beim Angriff der 3rd Marine Division auf Cape Torokina, Bougainville, am 1. November 1943 konnte ein einziges 75mm Typ 41 (1908) Regimentsgeschütz in wenigen Minuten mit 50 Schüsse 5 Landungsbooten zerstören und 10 weitere beschädigen. Das waren natürlich relativ kleine und leichtgebaute LCVPs, aber immerhin.

Gruss,
Gerard

[mhorgran]

Also ich finde ein MG pro 100m nicht dünn.

Da hier völlig sinnfreie, anderes Gelände und jetzt sogar schon andere Zeiten (als nächstes werden wahrscheinlich die römischen Landungen in .... -woauchimmer- herangezogen) , "Vergleiche" so unglaublich beliebt sind:
http://books.google.de/books?id=sN1-w9qXgX4C&pg=PA89&hl=de&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false

[Trimmer]

Hallo Gerard - und aus dem D-Day ( Overlord ) lernen wir  ( Bekämpfung von Landari vom Schiff aus, Niederhaltung der Verteidigung usw. )  Wärend also eine Landung 1940 völlig negiert wird - zugegeben mit vielen Fragezeichen, wird doch schon bei der Besetzung Norwegens als auch dann bei Kreta bewiesen das es durch aus möglich gewesen wäre.   

Gruß - Achim- Trimmer

PS: die Zahlen über die Stärke einer Division und ihre Bewaffnung sagen noch lange nichts über ihren Kampfwert aus bzw. sehr wenig

[Bergedorf]

Moin,

hier mal ein Auszug aus dem Erfahrungsbericht des Transportflottenführers C:

M.E. hätte es infolge zu späten Anlaufens und nicht genügender Vorbereitung sowie völlig fehlender Ausbildung des betreffenden Fahrzeug- und Prahmraumes im Zusammenfahren allergrößte Schwierigkeiten gemacht, bzw. wäre es nicht mit dm gewünscheten Erfolg möglich gewesen, eine Transportflotte Ende September oder Anfang Oktober an die seitens der Truppe geforderte Landungsstelle an der gegenüberliegenden Feindküste in der gewünschten Ordnung zu führen besonders nicht in der Nacht

Gruß

Dirk

[Knouterer]

Hallo Trimmer,

Aus Overlord/D-Day lernen wir dass das Niederhalten der Verteidigung durch Schiffsari mit etwas Mühe durchaus möglich ist - wenn man über etwa 30 Schlachtschiffe & Kreuzer plus 100 Zerstörer verfügt. Das war bei Seelöwe aber nachdrücklich nicht der Fall.
Abgesehen davon war die deutsche Seite anscheinend nicht besonders gut informiert über die Küstenverteidigung - Schenk erwähnt dass eine Staffel Stukas eine "vermutete" Batterie bei Dungeness angreifen sollte, dann erwähnt er noch das die Brandenburger eine Batterie auf Beachy Head ausschalten sollten - da gab es aber keine, soviel ich feststellen kann, nur eine Radarstation mit Flakschutz.
Die deutschen wussten natürlich das Häfen wie Dover, Folkestone, Newhaven verteidigt wurden, aber dass alle Paar km eine Emergency Battery mit zwei 6-inch Kanonen installiert war, scheint an ihnen vorbeigegangen zu sein. 

[Knouterer]

Auf diese Seite gibt's ein sehr interessantes Bild, Blick vom Kirchturm von Fairlight - man sieht fast den ganzen Abschnitt C und dahinter bis nach Dover:

http://www.pillbox.org.uk/pillblogs/detail.asp?ID=315 .