Seelöwe

[Bergedorf]

Hallo Karsten,

ACG = www.armschairgeneral.com
TTTSNBN= The threat that should never be ... das letzte Word fehlt mir glaube ich... ein ewig langer Threat mit viel Streiterei aber auch ein paar ganz interessanten Infos drinne versteckt.

Gruß

Dirk

[Leandros]

What does "ACG" and "TTTSNBN" mean?   

Karsten

ArmChairGeneral and "The Thread That Shall Not Be Named". This thread stretched over 1.000 ACG pages and 15.000 postings discussing (quarreling on.... ..) Unternehmen Seelöwe. The author of this book: http://daleypublishing.com/sealion.htm (me) was prominent in launching quite a lot of new (and quite unpopular) information on the subject.....

[Karsten]

The author of this book: http://daleypublishing.com/sealion.htm (me) was prominent in launching quite a lot of new (and quite unpopular) information on the subject.

Hello Fred,

welcome on board!!

Can you name some of your new, unpopular and discussed information? What's new in your book?

Regards,

Karsten

[Leandros]

Hello Fred,

welcome on board!!

Can you name some of your new, unpopular and discussed information? What's new in your book?

Regards,

Karsten

Thank you!

Boy, oh boy - that is a large subject!!! I wouldn't want to start the war again....

[Bergedorf]

Hi Fred,

are your researches based on original documents (Kew, Freiburg etc.), or only on secondary sources?

Regards,

Dirk

[Karsten]

Fred,

Boy, oh boy - that is a large subject!!! I wouldn't want to start the war again....

just mention a few points - see it as some advertisement for your book!

Regards,

Karsten

[Leandros]

Hi Fred,

are your researches based on original documents (Kew, Freiburg etc.), or only on secondary sources?

Regards,

Dirk

Dirk, I have not been to Freiburg. My inspiration to start looking into Seelöwe was Karl Klee's books. If anything, I feel my book is better than many others in that I to a larger degree holds it together with contemporary events. I mean, what happened in 1944 is of little interest to the subject. What happened in 1939-'41 is. (Poland, Norway, France, Dunkirk, Greece, Crete - even Operation Cerberus in '42) is.

[Leandros]

Fred,

Boy, oh boy - that is a large subject!!! I wouldn't want to start the war again....

just mention a few points - see it as some advertisement for your book!

Regards,

Karsten

OK, some keywords:

The viability of the landing fleet
The underestimation of the Kriegsmarine
The lack of Royal Navy readiness as to the actual number of units in the Channel area
The misconception of the air battle of Britain in context with the Seelöwe.
The disagreements within the British military leadership.

A couple of specific points I have not seen mentioned earlier as being of any importance:

The falling out of the British radar chain as soon as the first German troops were ashore.
The defense capabilites of the landing fleet itself
The lack of considering the 19 available KM Type 35 minesweepers as a fighting force.

[Huszar]

Hy,

The viability of the landing fleet

yes, I also think, the seaworthiness of the barges is grossly underestimated

The lack of Royal Navy readiness as to the actual number of units in the Channel area

besides a lot of small trawlers, I managed to find only a handfull of destroyers in the Chanell ports (i.e. 9 DD&DE). However, Sheerness and Harwich are a completly other matter (12+7 DD&DE). The 2 Cruisers in Plymouth, 2 in Sheerness 3 in the Humber (and Erebus) are also a force to be reckogned with.
IF (and not when), of course, they manage a nighttime intercept...

The misconception of the air battle of Britain in context with the Seelöwe.

That would be?

The falling out of the British radar chain as soon as the first German troops were ashore.

Nope. We made a nice attempt with Dirk on Seelöwe in another forum, we had Rye overrun somewhere S+5, Fairlight S+3, Pevensey S+7 and Beachy Head S+4. With some adjustments, they maybe have 30-60 minutes more. But not "as soon as"...
On the other hand, if/when these sites are overrun, the British have some serious problems between Beachy Head and Dungeness.

The defense capabilites of the landing fleet itself

Practically 0?

The lack of considering the 19 available KM Type 35 minesweepers as a fighting force.

Against grown-up destroyers? Practically 0?

best regards

alex

[Bergedorf]

I have just this minute read the KTB of the 16. Vp-Fl.

The only operational ships for Seelöwe September 1940 were:

VP 1601 Skorpion and
VP 1604 Natter

both left Bordeaux (!) to go to Boulogne on the 19th September 1940 08:00. Then came the cancelation-order.

It´s quite a long way from Bordeux to Boulogne, so I think we can scratch this Flotilla. 18. Vp. Fl. and 20. Vp. Fl. were also not (fully?) operational.

We have to look on operational readiness of both sides, if we want to get a clear view.

Cheers

Dirk

(p.s.: Ich hoffe mein Englisch ist nicht zu grausam... Fremdsprechen waren noch nie meine Stäke)

[Huszar]

Hallo,

We have to look on operational readiness of both sides, if we want to get a clear view.

That's absolutely correct. Ships and aircraft tends to get inoperable from time to time. Or have other duties to perform, not just sitting in a port (or on an airfield) and wait.

(Ich glaube, dein englisch ist ein wenig besser, als meins. Ich benutze die Sprache in letzter Zeit kaum aktiv...)

mfg

alex

[Bergedorf]

neuer Stand, nach Durchsicht KTB 18. VP.Fl.

Diese Flottille kann vollständig gestrichen werden. Kein Schiff in Dienst!

Gruß

Dirk

[Leandros]

Hy,

Nope. We made a nice attempt with Dirk on Seelöwe in another forum, we had Rye overrun somewhere S+5, Fairlight S+3, Pevensey S+7 and Beachy Head S+4. With some adjustments, they maybe have 30-60 minutes more. But not "as soon as"...
On the other hand, if/when these sites are overrun, the British have some serious problems between Beachy Head and Dungeness.

For all practical purposes that is "as soon as" in my book..... ..

[Leandros]

Hy, besides a lot of small trawlers, I managed to find only a handfull of destroyers in the Chanell ports (i.e. 9 DD&DE). However, Sheerness and Harwich are a completly other matter (12+7 DD&DE). The 2 Cruisers in Plymouth, 2 in Sheerness 3 in the Humber (and Erebus) are also a force to be reckogned with.
IF (and not when), of course, they manage a nighttime intercept...

This is where I was quite surprised. Even if many destroyers were listed as stationed around the Channel (Portsmouth, Sheerness, Harwich) they weren't there! It was their flotillas that were stationed there. Most had actually gone back to escort service on the western approaches in the end of September. Also, many were not operational even if listed as such (Pink List September 15th, naval-history.net).

[Huszar]

Hy,

The Pink List is in fact faulty in this respect, I have found about half a dozen destroyers in that list (listed for Portsmouth?!?!?), which were at that time in the Atlantik protecting convoys.

The 9+12+7 are the ones that were at Plymouth, Sheerness or Harwich at dates after the 15.09 and before ca. 30.09 (with another 4 in the Humber)! Of course, there is a chance, that some of the Sheerness- and Harwich-boats were on some East-Coast-Convoy south of Newcastle, BUT I have another 8 DD&DE definitevly on East-Coast-Convoys (not counting 14 sloops and minehunters on the East-Coast-Convoys, another 18 in Sheernes, Harwich and the Humber, and another 10 in the vicincy of Rosythe/Scapa. And not counting the dozens of trawlers).

Yes, the situation was bad, and yes, I also think that Seelöwe would be possible, but the British were also not stupid.

If I don't get some serious evidence, I won't buy that there were practically no destroyers between Plymouth and the Humber. Sorry.

mfg

alex