Seelöwe

[Spee]

I think... 

[Leandros]

Hehehe...

Die anderen beiden AP.3-Zerstörer waren Volunteer und Wolverine, von denen ich ersteres in Plymouth habe 

(farbige Liste gibt beide mit Portsmouth an!)

Die einzige Möglichkeit ist wohl, nach England zu fahren, die KTBs aller 183 Zerstörer, 50 Kreuzer, und xxx Sloops, Korvetten, Minensucher und U-Boote für den September durchzusehen.

Die Farbigen Listen sind anscheinend nicht wirklich zuverlässig.

Hoffentlich hat Hr. Leandros uns diese Arbeit erspart, und seine Aussage fusst auf den KTBs. 

mfg

alex

I am sorry that I have to disappoint you on this one. My main apparatus to question the Pink List has been the www.naval-history.net as my real intention was more to question the extent of the numerical superiority of the Royal Navy than to pinpoint each of their vessels. In the same sense I have taken much information from the www.german-navy.de and www.uboat.net.

[Leandros]

I am grateful for the kind reception you have given me here. Please find below parts of the Prologue of my book which should give you an indication as to how I have seen the subject.

"Unternehmen Seelöwe, Operation Sea Lion, was the name of the planned German invasion of the United Kingdom scheduled for fall 1940. It never happened. Despite the fact that the invasion did not take place, Operation Sea Lion is one of the most discussed items on the special web sites devoted to topics from the Second World War. This what-if scenario engages almost as many people as of the actual great operations of the same period – the invasion of the Soviet Union, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the landings in Normandy or the question of whether Montgomery and Eisenhower were heroes or no more than average leaders of armies.

The subject of Sea Lion is popular, but the debate is often so heated that reason quickly goes overboard. The topic obviously touches on powerful sentiments. Firmly cemented fronts are created – a powerful Allied position and a much weaker German one. Quickly the German side will be called Krauts or Nazis and the conclusion of the discussion is rapidly reached. Those advocating the German side are perceived as someone who really wanted the (eventual) invasion to succeed, even if that person only wants to evaluate certain historic points. Because my conclusions about Sea Lion are somewhat different than the popular ones, I have found myself on the receiving side of this treatment many times.

I am astonished by the ridiculing of this operation on the web. Could the German military leaders at that time really have been as amateurish as they were described? It did not fit in with the contemporary events. As my interest was awakened I discovered an operation that was fascinating in concept and planned execution and of which I, in spite of my lifelong interest in military history, knew so little about. The victors – read: the British side – readily forget that it was not they who contributed the most to the final Allied victory – and that in the fall of 1940 everything was totally uncertain.

I find it meaningless to discuss the theoretical outcome of an executed Seelöwe without the condition that Hitler really wanted to go through with it and that his directives for it were adhered to.This would have given the German forces an even better base for the operation than what was actually the case in September 1940. At the same time one must project the events that were planned for the 10-day period between the day the go-ahead was given (S-10), and the day of the first landings (S-day). I have filled a large part of this book with descriptions of the German plans and resources. There are good reasons for this. It is quite obvious that most debaters on the subject have spent too little time on studies of that side and therefore often have come to the wrong conclusions as to the German combat potential. I would like to correct this. The ability to see many German orders translated directly should underline the reality of the project. Enjoy it!"

[Bergedorf]

Hallo Alex,

von dem Planspiel habe ich mich, da es im Moment ja nicht läuft entfernt und beschäftige mich damit auch nicht weiter. Ich kan auch nicht sagen, ob die Pink List im Netz korrekt ist oder nicht. Aber für den 23 september habe ich sie vorliegen.

Danach (Infos zur Accounting station, der crewing division und zu Asdic etc. lasse ich weg:

Portsmouth Command
...
Ninth Destroyer Flotilla
17th Division
Havelock: Arrived Liverpool 20 September
Highlander: Left Liverpool 20 September
Harvester: Left Liverpool 20 September
Hesperus: Arrived Liverpool 19 September
Hurricane: Left Greenock 21 September

Zu SL 47 habe ich im Netz folgendes gefunden:
"Convoy SL.47 departed Freetown escorted by armed merchant cruiser CARNARVON CASTLE until the 26th, when destroyers HARVESTER, HIGHLANDER, HURRICANE, armed merchant cruiser MOOLTAN, sloop FOWEY, plus corvettes ANEMONE, MALLOW, and PEONY joined." http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4009-22SEP01.htm

Die 3 Hs waren also ab 26.09 bei dem Konvoi, was mit den Auslaufdaten übereinstimmen könnte.

Für den 13.09 ist dort verzeichnet: "HIGHLANDER, HARVESTER, BULLDOG, and BEAGLE swept from Cherbourg to Le Havre"

15.09: "Convoy OB.214 departed Liverpool escorted by destroyer HURRICANE and corvettes GERANIUM and PERIWINKLE. The destroyer detached on the 17th. " ist in meiner Version der Internet Pink List auch so verzeichnet.

18.09: "Destroyer HURRICANE (Senior Officer for OB.214 escort) was detached from her convoy to rescue survivors.
Destroyer HURRICANE picked up 117 survivors from CITY OF BENARES and MARINA and arrived at Greenock on the 20th." Paßt mit meiner Liste.

20.09: "Convoy OG.43 of forty six ships departed Liverpool....Destroyers HIGHLANDER and HARVESTER escorted the convoy from 20 to 25 September. Destroyer HURRICANE joined the escort on the 21st and departed on the 25th." paßt auch wunderbar.

Und wegen der Beschießung von Cherbourg oben mußt Du bedenken, dass die pink List den Stand 4 p.m. angibt. Und so eine Beschießung lief ja so, abends raus aus den Hafen, Schießen, morgens wieder zurück im Hafen.

Ich kann da also keine Wiederspüche entdecken? Sind die dann Hs dann damit geklärt?

Gruß

Dirk

Nachtrag: Ach so ab dem 17.09 hat die RN wieder das Kesselreinigen erlaubt, was davor untersagt war. Die Verlegung von Portsmouth nach Liverpool könnte (ist aber reine Spekulation) damit zusammenhängen, dass die Invasionsgefahr geringer eingeschätzt wurde.

[Leandros]

Against grown-up destroyers? Practically 0?

best regards

alex

So, what is a grown-up destroyer...?....The prominent RN destroyers in the vicinity of the Channel in September 1940 I believe were the Hunt I's and V&W's. They ea. had 4x4 in. guns of a similar (or slightly smaller) calibre than the two of the Type M35's. The Hunts did not have torpedo tubes. Is there any reason why two M35's should not equalize one of these....?...

Yes, the RN destroyers were faster (the Hunts: 25 knots) but the M35's (max 21 knots) couldn't go anywhere, they were escorts for the invasion fleet.

[Bergedorf]

Sorry Fred,

but according to Gröner did the M35 only 18,2kn.

Regards

Dirk

[Leandros]

Sorry Fred,

but according to Gröner did the M35 only 18,2kn.

Regards

Dirk

No need to be sorry - all information is valuable. According to Karl Meyer who actually commandeered an M-boat it had the sprint speed as mentioned by me. I know their regular max. speed was 18 knots. The Hunts, alas, also had problems with their 25 knots. Particularly in a rough sea. It is not really important in this context.

[Leandros]

I have on several occasions discussed if the Type M35 could be considered a worthy opponent to RN destroyers. The most prominent argument against it is that the M35 did not have a centralized FCS - Fire Control System. Its artillery was served in so-called local control, meaning by the various gun crews. I have never understood why that wouldn't work eminently, especially in short-range night fighting. Anyway, I have recently found that the M35 had a position for a Fire Control Officer (Leiter artilleriegeschüsse) in connection with the 3 m. rangefinder on the upper bridge. I also believe the German naval vessels (and the Japanese) had better optics than Allied vessels of this period. Which is important during nocturnal combat.

Further, the M35 had a weapons load of 240 shells (HE and AP) for each gun, which is good, and a rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute. Equivalent to the RN destroyers.

[Huszar]

Hallo, Dirk,

Die Liste, die im Netzt rumschwirrt, ist vom 15.09, nicht vom 23.09! Wir haben damals die Liste vom 15.09 benutzt, und auch da bin ich auch nicht wirklich sicher, ob die wirklich passen.

So, what is a grown-up destroyer...?....The prominent RN destroyers in the vicinity of the Channel in September 1940 I believe were the Hunt I's and V&W's. They ea. had 4x4 in. guns of a similar (or slightly smaller) calibre than the two of the Type M35's. The Hunts did not have torpedo tubes. Is there any reason why two M35's should not equalize one of these....?...

I hope, you are aware, that there were 3 types of v&Ws. The original with 4", the modified ones with 4,7" and the Wairs with 4" AA.

No need to be sorry - all information is valuable. According to Karl Meyer who actually commandeered an M-boat it had the sprint speed as mentioned by me. I know their regular max. speed was 18 knots. The Hunts, alas, also had problems with their 25 knots. Particularly in a rough sea. It is not really important in this context.

Double standards. You pick sprint-speed for one side, and practical speed for the other. The Hunts are rated for 27 Kn, not 25...

I should also remark, that its easier to sink a 500ts ship, than a 1000ts one with the same number of shots.

btw:
naval-history.net gives often only a very broad impression, where the actual ship was. A more serious attempt would be to check the war diaries of the ships...

best regards

alex

[Bergedorf]

Hallo Alex,

ich habe aber eine Kopie der Liste vom 23.09. zu Hause (Originalkopie aus Kew - nichts aus dem Netz).

Und sowohl die I-Netliste als auch meine Liste passen zumindest mit www.naval-history.net zusammen.

Das mit dem Konvoi hat sich ja auch geklärt.

Gruß

Dirk

[Leandros]

Double standards. You pick sprint-speed for one side, and practical speed for the other. The Hunts are rated for 27 Kn, not 25...

I should also remark, that its easier to sink a 500ts ship, than a 1000ts one with the same number of shots.

best regards

alex

Alex, I'd hoped you wouldn't use expressions like "double standards" as it implies a degree of dishonesty on my side. I did write max. speed 21 knots. This is of some interest as I have the distinct feeling that the 18 knots figure, till now, has been perceived as its max. speed. That said, Wikipedia quotes the (loaded) max speed of the Hunt I as 26 knots. Also, I suppose you are not thinking of the M35 when you write "500" tons, as its loaded displacement was approx. 850 tons. My remark on the speed-holding problems of the Hunt I is taken from sources serving on/with them. At one time I remarked that the M35 had better sea-going qualities than the Hunt I. Imagine the uproar from "the other side".... ...

However, these are not the central points. That is the total downgrading of the M35 as an efficient fighting machine in the context of Seelöwe. Particularly as 19 such units (as far as I have found) could be assigned to the operation. Furthermore, the German minesweeper flotillas were extremely coordinated and worked-up. I cannot find that any M35's were sunk by RN destroyers in the early (before the general implementation of radar on RN destroyers) period of the war. This in spite of the many skirmishes in the Channel. Please correct me if I am wrong.

So, my question stands: Could not two M35's be equal to one "normal" (time and place) RN destroyer.

[Bergedorf]

Hi Fred,

you know that every sunken M 35 means 100 Soldiers less in the Vorausabteilung. And every combat means time to go, so that the time plan gets out of order.

Another point, have you considered the lots of RN MS-/AS-Trawlers?

Regards

Dirk

[Huszar]

Hallo,

So, my question stands: Could not two M35's be equal to one "normal" (time and place) RN destroyer.

All the matter of semantics. How do you define a "normal" destroyer?
If you refer to a Hunt or a Wair, the answer is maybe.
If you refer to an early V&W, the answer is not likely.
If you refer to anything else, the answer is never.

Please note, that I haven't found a single pre-late-V&W in Plymouth/Portsmouth, also none in the Humber, from the 7 Harwich-boats is only one an early V&W, and from the 11 Sheerness-Boats I have data here only 6 were of the Hunt/Wair club and another 3 were early V&Ws.

alex

[Kosmos]

Luftwaffe war nicht mal in der Lage die RAF allein in einem Zeitraum von etwa 1.5-2 Monaten zu zerschlagen, Seelöwe hätte eine bis zu 20 Tage lange See- UND Luftschlacht bedeutet, wie sollte diese Luftwaffe da ihre Aufgaben erfüllen können?
Kriegsmarine war ein Witz, ihre Einheiten sind nicht nur nummerisch viel zu schwach, nein sie dürften in diesem Zeitraum doch gar keine Verluste haben, denn sonst bleiben für die Sicherung während dieser Schlacht de facto nur einzelne verstreute Schiffe...

[Leandros]

Luftwaffe war nicht mal in der Lage die RAF allein in einem Zeitraum von etwa 1.5-2 Monaten zu zerschlagen, Seelöwe hätte eine bis zu 20 Tage lange See- UND Luftschlacht bedeutet, wie sollte diese Luftwaffe da ihre Aufgaben erfüllen können?
Kriegsmarine war ein Witz, ihre Einheiten sind nicht nur nummerisch viel zu schwach, nein sie dürften in diesem Zeitraum doch gar keine Verluste haben, denn sonst bleiben für die Sicherung während dieser Schlacht de facto nur einzelne verstreute Schiffe...

You really shouldn't confuse the Battle of Britain with what was required of the Luftwaffe to fullfill their Seelöwe missions.......just my opinion....