Einsatzbereite S-Boote 16. bzw. 24.09.1940

[Bergedorf]

Hallo Gerard,

die Verminungen sollten vorher stattfinden. In der S-Nacht sollten die S-Boote östlich der Minensperren stehen und dort den Briten auflauern.

Gruß

Dirk

[Leandros]

Do I understand correctly that according to the Seelöwe plans all of the S-Boote would have been used for last minute minelaying close to the enemy shore (to protect the landing zones), so that in principle none of them would have been available for other tasks, such as protecting the convoys?

I have not seen that mentioned anywhere (also not in the minelaying schedule in Schenk's book) and find it rather unlikely. I have also seen no such information on the R-boats which, after all, were better adapted to minelaying than the S--boats. Any other concrete information on this would be appreciated. That said, and as far as I know, the S-boats could carry their regular two torpedoes and a mine-load. As has been established by me their normal torpedo load in the Channel and elsewhere was four torpedoes.

OTH, what is meant by "last-minute" minelaying.

Fred

[Bergedorf]

Moin,

wie gesagt in der S-Nacht Torpedoeinsatz östlich der Minensperren nach Operationsbefehl Nr. 1 des Seebefehlshaber West vom 14.09.1940. Die Nächte davor Mineneinsätze nach gesonderten Sperrbefehl (genaue Quelle müßte ich im Seelöwe-Threat bereits einmal genannt haben).

Gruß

Dirk

[Knouterer]

I posed the question because i've just been reading "German S-Boats in Action in the Second World War" (H. Frank, orig. German edition 2006). In the (admittedly very short) chapter on Seelöwe the author states:

"Immediately before the beginning of Seelöwe, the S-boats had had (sic) the task of laying flanking minefields either side of the intended troop transport route right under the coast (footnote here refers to "Mining orders as Annexe to War Diary Group West, 10 September 1940, Folios 103 and 175ff"). During the invasion proper, particularly following the second and third waves, the S-boats were to have protected the supply route."

By the way, Schenk does note this  in his chapter on mine barriers (page 381): "Zusätzlich zu diesen Sperren sollten Gebiete dicht unter der Küste durch Schnellboote mit Minen verseucht werden. Es waren dies die Gebiete CS und BS".

[Bergedorf]

Hallo Gerard,

ich habe diese Befehle vorliegen. Es gab insgesamt 4 Schnellboot-Verseuchungszonen: A S, B S, C S, und D S. Schenk hatte einen älteren Befehl zitiert in dem A S und D S noch nicht vorkamen.

Der Sperrbefehl ist: Marinegruppenkommando West gKdos. 1245/40 A3 Chefs. V. 9.9.1940

Danach sollten die Sperren in 9 aufeinanderfolgenen Nächten ab der S-9 Nacht, also bis S-1 Nacht geworfen werde.

Den Operationsbefehl des Seebefehlshabers West (Lütjens) hast Du im Schenk (S. 241).

Gruß

Dirk

[Knouterer]

Very well, but that means that in all probability the S-boats would not have been available to protect the Rotterdam convoy ( clearly one of the many weak links of the plan) on S-1, would they (given the need to refuel and give the crews some rest &c.)?
And for the moment I stick to my reasonable assumption that the movement of ships through the Nieuwe Waterweg and the forming up of the convoy off the Hook, starting on S-2, would have been noticed and would have provoked an attack by the RN (say a destroyer flottila and 2-3 cruisers).